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Foreword 
When I started the Masters in Environmental Studies program in September 2009 I knew that I would 
focus my research on climate change policy, but had no idea how challenging it would be to find a 
suitable topic within that broad area to write on.  Having realized that I wouldn’t be able to solve the 
world’s greenhouse gas problem single-handedly, I narrowed down my research interests in the Plan of 
Study to climate change governance in Canada. Given the intimate link between greenhouse gases and 
economic activity and the predominance of market-based instruments in policy proposals, the 
theoretical perspective of my work became the political economy of climate change.  Through course 
work I learned about the dynamic process through which climate change policy is formed at the national 
and provincial levels and the major barriers to effective policy development in Canada. I also honed my 
skills as a policy analyst through several terms papers and other course work.  The role of business 
actors in climate change mitigation is another major theme of my Plan of Study which I explored again 
through course work and independent study.   In this major research paper I have explored, in depth, 
how a sub-national jurisdiction in Canada (Ontario) could design an environmentally effective emissions 
trading program multilaterally in collaboration with other sub-national jurisdictions.  This research aligns 
with at least two aspects of my area of concentration: Canadian environmental policy and 
environmental economics, and satisfies several of my learning objectives: understanding the dynamics 
of climate change federalism in Canada, role of business in climate change policy, and the range 
instruments available to policymakers wishing to regulate GHGs and the advantages and disadvantages 
of each.   I hope that the findings and recommendations found herein are useful to policymakers in 
Ontario and beyond as climate change governance evolves.     
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Abstract 
This major research paper addresses the question of how a sub-national entity such as Ontario can 
design an environmentally effective greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading system in the context of 
policy gridlock in Canada and through the UNFCCC process.  The paper begins by exploring the historical 
context of climate change policy at the international and national levels in order to demonstrate how we 
have arrived at the current situation of policy gridlock and illustrate the opportunity for sub-national 
entities such as Ontario to take a progressive approach to climate change mitigation. But as climate 
change policy develops in an asymmetrical fashion within Canada, North America and the globe, 
policymakers in Ontario need to carefully design the proposed emissions trading system to balance the 
need to maintain environmentally integrity of the system (i.e. make a contribution to the 
decarbonization of the provincial economy) without overly harming the economic competitiveness of 
the province vis-à-vis neighboring jurisdictions who are not implementing comparably stringent policies.  
Such asymmetrical policy development could damage the long-term political acceptability of the 
program should economic losses reduce the relative prosperity of Ontarians and also the environmental 
integrity of the program if emissions-intensive activities relocate to jurisdictions without stringent GHG 
controls.   As such the paper examines important elements of emissions trading programs: setting the 
cap; distributing allowances; designing the offset system; managing the interaction with existing 
renewable energy policies; and the treatment of emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries; with a 
view to improving the environmental integrity of Ontario’s proposed program without harming its 
economic competitiveness.  In each of these areas the experience garnered in the European Union 
Emissions Trading program (EU ETS) has been leveraged to provide policy recommendations to Ontario 
policymakers.  The EU ETS has been in operation longer than any other GHG emissions trading program, 
and is the closest in design to Ontario’s proposed system.  With the EU ETS having undergone a major 
revision in 2009 which will apply for the 2013-2020 time period, there is a major opportunity for Ontario 
to apply the lessons learned in Europe to its emissions trading program.  The research methodology for 
this paper was a comparative analysis that used primary sources in the form of policy documents and 
interviews to understand the proposed design of Ontario’s program and secondary research using 
academic research that has evaluated the effectiveness of emissions trading programs in Europe and 
beyond. 
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1. Introduction: Ontario's place in multi-level climate governance  
 
The Canadian Province of Ontario has staked out a significant role in the global effort to mitigate 
climate change.  Its electricity policies, including the phase-out of coal and the related feed-in tariff for 
renewable electricity sources have made it a leading jurisdiction in North America.  Ontario has also 
allied itself with a group of environmentally progressive sub-national North American jurisdictions 
through the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) which includes California, British Columbia, and Quebec as 
active members. As an active WCI member Ontario is committed to developing a provincial cap-and-
trade program that is linked to other jurisdictions to create a regional market. The regional cap-and-
trade program is being proposed to directly manage GHG emissions reductions across major sectors of 
the Provincial economy: electricity, transportation, buildings, industry and indirectly in others: waste 
management, agriculture and forestry (and potentially others) through a complementary offset 
program.   
If implemented, cap-and-trade would be a central element of the Province's effort to reduce 
greenhouse gases (GHGs).  But the devil is in the details of course, of which cap-and-trade has many. 
Design elements such as how to set the overall cap (i.e. cap-setting), distribute the allowances that 
result (allowance allocation), determine eligible offset projects, manage interaction effects with existing 
policies, and mitigate trade and competitiveness impacts are all important factors that will determine 
the success of the overall program.   Such details are currently being developed at the supra-subnational 
level through the WCI design process.   
The WCI began in 2007 when a group of western U.S. States (California, Oregon, Washington, New 
Mexico and Arizona) agreed to work towards the development of a regional cap-and-trade program.  
Over the next year four Canadian Provinces (B.C., Manitoba, Quebec and Ontario) and two U.S. states 
(Utah and Montana) would join, bringing the total number of participating jurisdictions to eleven.  
Design details for the program began to emerge in 2008 and culminated with the release in July 2010 of 
the final recommended design for the regional cap-and-trade program (actual implementation of the 
recommended design will occur at the member-jurisdiction level and so there are likely to be differences 
between the linked cap-and-trade systems).  Additional design details, including the offset system 
design, and the central tracking and auction system for emission allowances, remain to be worked out 
and were intended to be released prior to the January 2012 start date of the regional program.  None of 
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the original WCI members are prepared for the 2012 start date however, with some having officially 
removed themselves from the cap-and-trade program (Arizona & Utah), others having not enacted 
enabling legislation (Oregon, Washington and Montana), and others behind in developing and 
implementing the policy architecture for emissions measurement, reporting and verification required 
for a proper functioning system (Ontario and Manitoba).  As of June 30, 2011 the leading jurisdiction in 
the WCI , California, officially delayed the start of its cap-and-trade program to 2013 in order to give the 
State’s Air Resources Board more time to work out the design details.   
In spite of the uncertainty surrounding the Western Climate Initiative, the current Ontario 
Government has stated that it remains committed to implementing a cap-and-trade system.  This 
research paper seeks to contribute to the effort to design an environmentally-effective cap-and-trade 
system in Ontario.  It will start by outlining the climate change problem, and the political response at the 
international, national and Provincial (Ontario) levels.  Having set the context of Ontario operating in a 
multi-level climate change governance regime, the paper will move to examine select design elements 
of Ontario's proposed cap-and-trade program.  Using experiential evidence from the European Union 
Emissions Trading Program (EU ETS), which is closest in design to that being proposed by Ontario, the 
paper will make recommendations to the Province on the design of its program to improve its 
effectiveness.  
 
1.1. The Climate Change “Threat” 
 
Anthropogenic climate change caused by increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in 
the atmosphere is one of the most serious threats facing humanity in the modern era.  The impacts of 
climate change are already becoming evident as changing weather patterns deteriorate water 
availability and food security and collapsing ecosystems intensify a decline in biodiversity that threatens 
the very fabric of life on this planet.  These impacts are predicted to intensify because GHG emissions 
reside in the atmosphere for decades and continue to rise. There is confirmation that the Earth’s 
temperature has increased by approximately 0.74% over the past century which has resulted in sea-level 
rise and increased frequency and intensity of heat waves, storms, floods and droughts (IPCC, 2007). The 
best estimate for warming over this century from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
is a further 1.8 to 4°C. This will intensify the impacts already being witnessed leading to potentially 
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catastrophic consequences for vulnerable human societies and natural ecosystems. The physical threats 
of climate change are compounded by the scale of response required to effectively respond. Indeed a 
fundamental revolution in the way that human societies produce and consume energy is necessary over 
a very short time horizon.   
 International consensus has emerged around the need to limit temperature rise to 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels so as to avoid triggering positive feedback effects that could intensify climate 
change impacts and thus render mitigation and adaption efforts exponentially more difficult.  Two such 
feedback effects include: (1) a decline in the extent of summer arctic sea ice which, because open water 
absorbs more heat than ice, would amplify warming and (2) melting permafrost which will release huge 
stores of methane long-stored in arctic peat bogs.   Among other impacts, amplification of the global 
warming process could intensify ice sheet melting in Greenland and Antarctica thus leading to greater 
than anticipated sea-level rises (Lenton et al., 2008). The 2°C threshold for warming was formally 
incorporated into the global policy discussion as part of the ‘Copenhagen accord’ produced by the UN 
Climate Change negotiations in December 2009.  
 Despite global rhetoric around the need to limit warming to 2°C, the reality is that this threshold 
has already been passed (IEA, 2011).  Indeed, assuming a mid-range of climate sensitivity, IPCC models 
suggest that achieving a maximum temperature rise of 2°C would require limiting atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2 to 370ppm (Dessler and Parson, 2006). Given that current atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2 are at 380ppm and rising rapidly, it is likely that temperature rises over the 
century will be closer to 4°C. The sea-level rise predicted to occur in a world 4°C warmer would inundate 
major cities like London, Boston, New York, Mumbai and Shanghai and devastate other low-lying coastal 
areas like Bangladesh (Fitzgerald et al., 2008).  Thus the evidence tells us that we need to reduce GHG 
emissions quickly in order to avoid catastrophic impacts on human societies and natural ecosystems.  
How quickly? A paper published in Nature in April 2009 showed that a global GHG emission reduction of 
80% by 2050 is necessary to have a less than 50% chance of exceeding the 2°C threshold by 2100 (Allen 
& al., 2009 and Meinshausen & al, 2009). 
 As the discussion above has made clear, dealing effectively with climate change will require a 
collective transformation of our global economy on a scale and time-trajectory unprecedented in human 
history.   In contrast to global environmental problems like ozone depletion and water pollution where 
policy solutions can be targeted at a much narrower scope of substances and activities, climate change 
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is deeply connected to the growth of the global capitalist economy and so dealing with it will require 
either a reconsideration of the capitalist growth model, or the development of new avenues of growth 
that are not dependent on the combustion of fossil fuels (i.e. decoupling emissions growth from 
economic growth)  (Newell & Paterson, 2010).  Related to this conundrum of how to stimulate a shift to 
low-carbon economic activity is the question of distribution of effort.  Given that developed countries 
have contributed disproportionately more to the climate change problem through their carbon-
intensive development pathway and that the world’s poor have an urgent need for economic growth to 
reduce the impacts of poverty, a fair solution to climate change would see the rich world reduce their 
emissions comparatively more to make ‘atmospheric space’ for developing countries to increase their 
emissions and fuel the economic growth required to provide the basic human requirements for 
sustenance.  This concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities” has been enshrined in the 
international response to climate change which will be discussed in the following section.   
 
1.2. The International Response  
 Climate change is a quintessential example of what Garret Hardin termed as a “commons 
problem” (Hardin, 1968) where the actions of individuals, firms and nations emit GHGs into the 
atmosphere that deplete a shared resource (in this case a “benign” climate). Given that each  individual 
actor is behaving in what is perceived as their own self-interest, they have little incentive to curb their 
own destructive actions unless they are assured that others will follow suit and not free-ride on the 
efforts of others.  This theoretical perspective underlies the idea that climate change is best governed 
through a global multilateral approach that coordinates the actions of all and thus mitigates the 
potential for individual nations to “free-ride” on the benefits of others.  This is similar to the “matching 
principle” found in environmental-law literature which argues that the level of jurisdictional authority 
(local, regional, national, global) that should take action to resolve a particular externality should match 
the geographic scope of the problem (Butler & Macey, 1996).   
 The response to climate change that began to emerge in the late 1980’s has followed this 
theoretical guidance in that it has focused on the global political arena. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) was formed shortly after the 1988 “Toronto Conference on the Changing 
Atmosphere” and was tasked with reviewing and assessing information relevant to the understanding of 
climate change (IPCC, 2010). Subsequently in 1992 the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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(UNFCCC) was produced at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro which represented the first global treaty 
addressing climate change. While not legally-binding, the UNFCCC established national-level reporting 
on GHG mitigation programs and annual inventories and set a target of returning GHG levels to 1990 
levels by the end of the decade (Bodansky & Diringer, 2010). National reports were subject to review by 
the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (CoP), thus creating the possibility for reputational sanctions for 
nations perceived as not acting in congruence with the UNFCCC target.       
 When the parties to the UNFCCC convention met at the first CoP in 1995 the non-binding 
“pledge and review” global policy trajectory set in motion earlier was superseded by an effort to create 
a more robust and legally binding set of emission reduction commitments and timetables. Developed 
countries who signed on to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol set legally binding emission reduction targets 
for the 2008-2012 period. This approach of setting binding targets and timetables followed the 
successful model of the Montreal Protocol addressing ozone depletion (Sunstien, 2006).  Two years after 
CoP-1 this form of climate governance would become enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol as a group of 
developed countries (so-called annex B countries) adopted binding emission caps to be achieved by the 
end of the agreement in 2012.   
 The global approach to climate change also came to take on a decidedly market-based, 
neoliberal flavour. Newell and Paterson (2010) describe this aspect of the response to climate change as 
having emerged from a period of economic crisis in the 1970’s that shifted economic ideology to the 
right (ibid: 18).  Neo-liberalism is an ideology that emphasizes the role of unbridled financial markets in 
economic growth, accepts rising inequality as a consequence of wealth-creating economic policies, and 
reduces the role of the state as a provider of goods and services in favour of private business.  With this 
ideology dominant flexible economic instruments have taken prominence in climate change policy.  
Rather than setting regulatory performance standards for large emitters, policy makers have to date 
preferred voluntary and market-based approaches (i.e. emissions trading or carbon taxation) to manage 
GHG emissions (Stavins, 2003). However this trend appears to be changing of late in North America 
where regulators are moving forward with sectoral emission standards for the electricity sector and 
select industrial sectors (i.e. automotive).   
The idea that market incentives could be used as the basis of environmental policy emerged on 
the political agenda in the 1980’s as ecological modernization became accepted as a legitimate 
approach (Newell & Paterson, 2010: 24).  As an approach, ecological modernization recognizes that 
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capitalism is concomitant with environmental problems, but can be made more environmentally friendly 
through the reform of political, economic and social institutions.  Dematerialization of production 
processes and decoupling of economic growth from resource use are key ideas underpinning ecological 
modernization discourse (Carter, 2007).  Within the context of ecological modernization, emissions 
trading emerged as the most prominent policy tool for managing climate change because compliance 
flexibility achieved through permit trading can theoretically support greater cost efficiency than a 
carbon taxation regime (Morris, 2009).  In addition to the support from economic theory for emissions 
trading, the political economic theory of instrument choice suggests that industrial actors will favour it 
because there is greater flexibility in complying with regulations and potential to leverage their 
privileged position in the policy process to influence the design of the program to suit their interests 
(Hepburn, 2006: 236).  
 Emissions trading formally entered the global climate change policy regime during Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations in 1996-97 (Ellerman, Convery, & de Perthuis, 2010: 17). U.S. negotiators, facing 
stiff domestic political resistance to the Kyoto Protocol and supported by the apparent success of 
emissions trading under the US Acid Rain Control program, overcame the resistance of the EU and other 
Kyoto parties to successfully include provisions for nations to achieve their emission reduction targets 
flexibly through the use of international emissions trading (IET), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
and Joint Implementation (JI) credits (Labatt & White, 2007). Kyoto Protocol IET allows countries holding 
excess assigned amount units (AAUs) to sell them to other countries who have exceeded their Kyoto 
Protocol target.  The CDM allows market participants in industrialized countries to invest in developing 
country emission reduction projects and obtain Certified Emissions Reductions credits (CERs) that can be 
used in lieu of reducing their own emissions for compliance in a cap-and-trade system.  Finally, JI 
projects are implemented in industrialized countries, or economies in transition (typically former Soviet 
Union countries) and generate emission reduction units (ERUs) for use in a cap-and-trade system  
(Labatt & White, 2007: 206).    
 While the global climate change regime has evolved in important ways by setting up a system 
for national reporting of emission reduction programs and inventories and financial mechanisms such as 
the CDM, its development has stalled due to the absence of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol, 
and the inability of some developed country signatories (i.e. Canada) to mobilize serious domestic 
efforts, or accept significant international commitments – a problem exacerbated by the global 
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economic crisis.   The stalling of the global climate regime became evident at the Copenhagen 
negotiations in December 2009 where it was hoped that a successor to the Kyoto Protocol would be 
agreed upon.  Instead, a non-binding  set of agreements on emission reductions and mobilizing climate 
finance resulted that represents a retrenchment from the international process (Bodansky & Diringer, 
2010).  With the global top-down approach to climate change now in a state of  limbo, the focus has 
gradually shifted back to the local, regional and national scale of action.  
 
1.3. Canada’s Response  
 Canada took a leadership role at the beginning of the global effort to address climate change. It 
hosted the first international conference on global warming in Toronto in 1988, and was one of the first 
countries to sign the UNFCCC in 1992 (MacDonald, 2009).  However, translating Canada's international 
commitments into implemented policy has proven to be challenging for Canada.  Its federal make-up 
gives significant power to the Provinces in the area of natural resource management which creates veto 
points for climate change policy.  Related to this is a lack of leadership at the federal level to develop 
institutions that creatively address the challenges presented by the Canadian federal context (ibid).  
Between 1992 and 1995 a federal-provincial process of collaboration between the Canadian 
Council of Ministers of Environment (CCME) and Council of Energy Ministers,  referred to as the Joint 
Meeting of Ministers (JMM) operated in an attempt to implement programs that would reduce GHGs. 
The decision-making process was consensual which gave resistant fossil energy-producing Provinces 
(most notably Alberta) a defacto veto . The resulting “National Action Program” represented a lowest-
common-denominator result of voluntary actions without the use of coercive law and/or tax measures 
to motivate reductions (ibid: 154).  
 Three years later Canada adopted the Kyoto Protocol in April 1998, where it committed to a 6% 
reduction below 1990 levels over the 5-year commitment period of 2008-2012. While the overall 
UNFCCC goal was to return GHG emissions to 1990 levels, the concept of common but differentiated 
responsibilities meant that Canada and other developed countries were to take on greater cuts in order 
to allow emissions to rise in less-developed countries. The JMM process was used again to negotiate a 
second national program, “Action Plan 2000 on Climate Change”, which again relied on voluntary action 
and $500m in fiscal measures to support GHG reduction (Government of Canada, 2000).  
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 Canada’s liberal-majority Parliament officially ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 despite the fact 
that the U.S. considered it “economically irresponsible” and refused to do so, and that industry and 
several Provinces were vociferously opposed (MacDonald, 2007).  Unilateral ratification of the Protocol 
by the Federal government without the support of all of the Provinces resulted in the collapse of the 
collaborative Federal-Provincial JMM process that had been operating up until that time. The Federal 
government then embarked on a set of bilateral negotiations with Provinces and industry over 2003-
2005 that was backed up with another $1b in incentives, bringing total federal spending on Kyoto to 
$3.7 billion. While significant progress was made through this approach as Individual agreements were 
reached with six provinces, Alberta maintained is vociferous opposition to federal action (Winfield & 
MacDonald, 2008). The result of Federal private negotiations with the oil and gas industry was an 
agreement that compliance costs would be capped at $15/tonne CO2eq  and with the auto industry that 
vehicle emission standards would cut emissions 5.3mt by 2010 (Pew Center, 2005).   
 By April 2005 the minority Liberal government under Paul Martin finally announced its Kyoto 
Implementation Plan entitled “Project Green” which fundamentally revamped the plan announced in 
2002. The government added the six GHGs from the Kyoto protocol to the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act (CEPA) list of Toxic Substances in December 2005 and proposed regulations to control 
emissions from large final emitters (LFEs). The new plan continued to rely on fiscal “carrots” ($10b in 
funding was announced in the budget for GHG reduction measures) and sought to win-over powerful 
industry stakeholders by relaxing emission reduction targets for LFEs to 15% (the upshot of which would 
be that a more significant burden would be carried by smaller emitters and individuals). In spite of the 
efforts to woo emissions intensive industry, the plan elicited a formal objection from Alberta who 
rejected the Federal Government’s jurisdiction to regulate GHGs (CBC News, 2007). 
The Conservative party came to power in January 2006 with an election promise to scrap 
Canada’s Kyoto Protocol commitments and develop a “made-in-Canada” approach to climate change 
that was bundled with urban air quality issues .  While not formally backing out of Kyoto, Canada 
announced that it would join the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, an 
initiative spearheaded by the U.S. Government as a voluntary alternative to the legally binding Kyoto 
Protocol. Just as the new Conservative Government was moving to dismantle the Kyoto-related 
programs set up by the predecessor Liberal government; polling data was showing the environment, 
driven by concern about climate change, was rising as an issue of public concern trumping health and 
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environment (The Strategic Council, 2007).  The Conservatives responded to this rising public concern 
with a new plan, Turning the Corner, which marked a return to the previous Liberal government policy 
albeit with weaker objectives and longer time-lines (Simpson, Jaccard, & Rivers, 2007). The plan shifted 
the Kyoto emissions baseline (1990) by setting a target of reducing emissions by 20% of 2006 levels by 
2020 but only required LFEs to reduce the intensity of their emissions (18% by 2010), rather than make 
absolute cuts as was proposed under the Martin government. 
 With the failure of the Federal Liberal party’s carbon tax-focused Green Shift election platform 
in 2008, the Conservative government’s obstinate stance on climate change was strengthened. However 
election of the Obama administration in the U.S. later in 2008, and the announcement that it intended 
to enact comprehensive climate legislation that included an economy-wide cap-and-trade program, 
resulted in another evolution in Canadian climate change policy.  The Conservative government moved 
from a desire for the “made-in-Canada” approach articulated in Turning the Corner to an attempt to 
harmonize policy with the U.S. in order to protect Canada’s bilateral trade (Environment Canada, 2008).   
 The U.S. Federal Government was unable to pass such comprehensive regulation, and has 
instead introduced regulations under the Clean Air Act that provides the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) with the authority to set emission performance standards for new or retrofitted industrial 
facilities. These regulations came into effect on January 1, 2011 but continue to be the subject of 
numerous challenges in both legislative and judicial arenas. While harmonization with the US was the 
stated Canadian government position, its proposed sectoral approach is less comprehensive than the 
U.S. EPA’s regulatory agenda (Partington, 2010).  For example, it has proposed regulations for the coal-
fired electricity sector that will apply a performance standard for new facilities and those that have 
reached the end of their economic life that is set at the emission intensity level of natural gas combined 
cycle (NGCC) technology (ibid).  In contrast, the U.S. EPA’s regulatory approach would apply to all coal-
fired electricity facilities, not just those that are new or undergoing significant retrofits.  The Canadian 
government has also suggested that GHG emission regulations for the oil sands sector will be passed 
later in 2011, although no details are yet available on the shape that these regulations will take.   
          
1.4. Ontario’s Response 
 Ontario was initially opposed to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.  It refused to sign the final 
version of the National Implementation Strategy at the JMM in October 2000, and supported Alberta’s 
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attempts to consider alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol in Federal-provincial consultation sessions . 
Ontario’s initial resistance to the Kyoto Protocol was due in part to the deregulatory agenda pursued by 
the Conservative government of the day, but also to concerns over the competitiveness impacts on key 
Provincial industrial sectors - such as automotive, chemicals and metal production - in North American 
markets (Bjorn et al., 2002: 68). 
 Ontario’s position changed in 2003 with the election of a Liberal government on an 
environmentally-progressive platform that included the phase-out of the Province’s coal-fired electricity 
plants. The Province successfully concluded a bilateral agreement with the Federal government that 
included significant amounts of federal funding to support Provincial GHG reduction efforts (Winfield & 
MacDonald, 2008) and began to increase its institutional capacity on climate change.  In 2005 the 
Province designated the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) as the lead ministry coordinating the 
climate change response across departments and created a Climate change directors group of 13 senior 
managers from different ministries who began to meet on an ad hoc basis.  While these developments 
signaled an evolution in the Province’s climate change governance regime, it still lacked a formal plan or 
strategy that was anchored on specific emission reduction targets and subject to performance review 
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2005: 61). 
 Ontario’s climate change regime evolved yet again in 2007 with the release of the Climate 
Change Action Plan (CCAP) that for the first time set a timeline of provincial GHG reduction targets that 
were in line with Canada’s Kyoto Protocol commitments: 6% below 1990 by 2014 (166Mt); 15% below 
1990 by 2020 (150Mt) and 80% below 1990 by 2050 (35Mt).  A major catalyst for this new approach was 
the release of the Federal Conservative Turning the Corner plan that was perceived to unfairly target 
Ontario’s automotive industry rather than the fast growing emissions in Alberta’s oil sands sector (Rice, 
2009).  
 With the Federal Conservative government in power the federal-provincial negotiation process -  
that had produced six agreements between the federal and provincial governments - broke down.  Prior 
to 2007 Ontario’s climate regime was criticized for its informal apportionment of responsibility, for its 
lack of a formal strategy, for not having institutionalized sufficiently stringent commitments, and for 
weak or non-existent public participation processes (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2005: 59). 
With the release of the Climate Change Action Plan in 2007, the Government appeared to be setting 
itself on a different evolutionary course for its climate governance regime.  The Climate Change 
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Secretariat was created to coordinate and implement the plan and the Environmental Commissioner of 
Ontario was given the responsibility of reviewing the government’s progress at achieving GHG reduction 
targets.  With ambitious policies enacted for the electricity sector (coal phase-out, green energy act) the 
Ontario government had set itself on a trajectory for achieving significant economy-wide reductions.  
But, in the years since this institutional arrangement has floundered.  The Secretariat has lacked the 
financial and human resources to coordinate a pan-government response to climate change, and the 
institutional authority to require government ministries to enact policy measures. As an indicator of the 
CCS’s institutional weakness, it is no longer mentioned in the government’s annual climate change 
mitigation report (Government of Ontario, 2011). The ECO has consistently criticized the transparency 
and ambitiousness of climate change governance in Ontario (see e.g. Environmental Commissioner of 
Ontario, 2010: 30), but recommended institutional reforms have not resulted.  
 
1.5. Climate Change Action Plan – Progress to Date 
 While Ontario’s GHG emissions plummeted 13% in 2009 to 165Mt – appearing to reach the 
2014 target 5 years early - these emissions declines were coincident with a global economic recession 
that slowed production at the province’s emissions-intensive industrial facilities.  With economic growth 
having returned to Ontario (the Provincial economy grew by 3.2% in 2010) GHG emissions are certain to 
have risen again.  Absent policy measures beyond the electricity sector, the Province is not likely to 
achieve its GHG reduction targets.  The Province admits this itself, pegging the gap between projected 
GHG emissions in 2014 and the target at 4Mt although some estimates have put this gap much higher at 
13Mt given the historical rate of improvement in GHG emissions intensity and projected economic 
growth (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2011).  
 Thus Climate Change Action Plan initiatives announced to date leave a significant gap in 
achieving the Province’s climate change goals.  Policy measures are desperately needed for the two 
largest contributors to GHGs in the Province: transportation (35%) and industry (33%). The Province has 
suggested that the introduction of a cap-and-trade system could be a significant factor in helping to 
close or eliminate the shortfall (ibid: 13). If implemented in collaboration with Western Climate Initiative 
jurisdictions as proposed (Government of Ontario, 2009), cap-and-trade would target electricity and 
large industrial emitters (>25k tons/annum) initially (Ontario’s start date for cap-and-trade was initially 
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to be 2012, but has since been delayed to an unknown future date) and transportation emissions from 
2015.      
 
2. Research Question and Methodology 
 The question thus becomes: given the political context of stalled international negotiations, 
and uncertain national and continental policy, how can Ontario's proposed cap-and-trade program be 
designed so that it makes an effective contribution to climate change mitigation?  While there are 
legitimate concerns over whether cap-and-trade as opposed to a carbon tax is an appropriate policy for 
Ontario (see e.g. Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2010: 22), these will not be addressed in this 
research paper.  Assuming that Ontario's decision to develop a cap-and-trade program is final, this paper 
will address the question above by examining five core design elements of a cap-and-trade program:  
1. Cap-setting 
2. Allowance allocation 
3. Offsets 
4. Interaction effects with complementary regulation  
5. Managing carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns  
Each of these elements will be the subject of a separate chapter. The analysis will compare the 
proposed design of Ontario's cap-and-trade program, which is modeled on the WCI design 
recommendations (Western Climate Initiative, 2010c), with the design and implementation of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) - the only other economy-wide cap-and-trade program in 
existence globally.  The EU ETS has recently undergone significant reforms in its third phase (2013-2020) 
which build upon the lessons learned in the first two phases to increase the stringency of the overall 
program (Skjaerseth, 2009).  This new design will figure heavily in making recommendations to Ontario 
on the design of its program that will appear at the end of each chapter.   
Information to support the analysis and recommendations has been gathered through a variety of 
sources.  Primary research in the form of a review of policy documents and participation in conference 
calls from the Province of Ontario, the Western Climate Initiative, and the European Union was used to 
develop an understanding of the cap-and trade policy architectures proposed (for Ontario, WCI and EU 
ETS phase III) and in operation (EU ETS phase II).  This primary literature review was complemented by 
an analysis of secondary literature from academic and NGO sources that has assessed proposed and 
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operational cap-and-trade systems from a political-economy and environmental integrity perspective.   
Finally, because significant design details of Ontario's cap-and-trade program remain unknown at this 
time in areas such as allocation, offsets, and market oversight, interviews with individuals involved in 
the development of Ontario's cap-and-trade system have been used to fill the information gaps that 
exist in the public sphere and to understand the policy options being considered by the province.  Three 
interviews were conducted with Ontario government officials from the Ministry of Environment, the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and the Office of the Environmental Commissioner of 
Ontario.  Informal conversations were also conducted with individuals from non-governmental 
organizations (Environmental Defence) and the private sector (the International Emissions Trading 
Association, the Cement Association of Canada and Offsetters Inc.) that are close to the cap-and-trade 
policy development process in Ontario.  
 
3. Cap-Setting  
 International consensus has emerged around a target of limiting temperature increase to 2°C 
above pre-industrial values. This target was incorporated into the UNFCCC at the Copenhagen accord in 
December 2009 (UNFCCC, 2009), and has been endorsed by the G-8 as a goal of international climate 
policy (Reuters, 2009).  While translating this temperature target into a corresponding GHG 
concentration and emissions reduction pathway entails significant uncertainty, IPCC climate models 
indicate that a GHG concentration of 450ppm is consistent with a 2°C warming by the end of the 
century.  Achieving this concentration requires a reduction of somewhere between 50% and 85% of 
2000 global GHG emissions by 2020, with CO2 emissions peaking between 2010 and 2015 (IPCC, 2007).  
 Given that developed Western nations have emitted proportionately more GHGs into the 
atmosphere than other nations, the contested but established concept of common but differentiated 
responsibilities suggest that, while all nations bear responsibility for climate change mitigation, those 
with a greater historical contribution and relative wealth should take on more aggressive emission 
reduction targets. Thus, while some developing nations may increase their emissions over the decades 
to 2050, OECD nations have agreed to make aggressive cuts of somewhere between 80% and 95% of 
2000 levels in order to prevent global temperature from rising more than 2°C (Tilford, 2008). 
Furthermore, the timing of emission reductions has important implications for the overall efficiency of 
achieving the 2050 target.  This is because, by delaying emission reductions until later in the 2010-2050 
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period, the learning-by-doing effects and induced innovation that reduce the costs and improve the 
effectiveness of new technologies are not sufficiently realized (Wing, 2003). The development and 
adoption of new technologies is slowed due to policy delay which results in increased overall costs.  The 
increased costs attributable to policy delay have been highlighted both at the global level by Nicholas 
Stern (2006) and the national level by the National Roundtables on the Environment and the Economy 
(NRTEE, 2011). 
 Thus the question for Ontario becomes, are the targets set out in the Climate Change Action 
Plan consistent with the current state of knowledge on emission reduction pathways for limiting 
temperature rise to 2°C by 2100, and have these been incorporated into the cap-and-trade system 
design (i.e. is the system likely to be environmentally effective)? This necessarily must include an 
assessment of the scope of the cap (i.e. does it cover enough emissions sources to be effective?). 
Secondly, is the timing of emission reductions over the 2010-2050 period likely to induce the early 
adoption of new technologies and thus increase the efficiency of the system over time?  This section will 
start by examining cap-setting in the EU ETS system in order to provide a context for the analysis of the 
environmental effectiveness and dynamic efficiency of Ontario’s proposed emissions caps.     
   
3.1. Cap-setting in the EU 
 Cap-setting in the EU ETS is guided by the European Community’s overall emission reduction 
commitments.  The original EU-15 members1 adopted a common Kyoto Protocol GHG reduction target 
of 8% below 1990 levels by 2012 with varying contributions ranging from -28% (in the case of 
Luxembourg) to +27% (in the case of Portugal). While the EU expanded after ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, new members were required to participate in the EU ETS as a condition of joining the EU and 
most are Kyoto signatories with reduction targets ranging from 6-8% (EU Commission, 2011).   
 For the post-Kyoto period, the EU Commission’s 2020 flagship initiative for a resource-efficient 
Europe commits members to reducing GHGs by 20%, increasing the share of renewable electricity in the 
EU's energy mix to 20%, and achieving a 20% improvement in energy efficiency by 2020 (European 
Commission, 2011). Because emission reductions are considered more cost effective in ETS sectors than 
                                                          
1
  EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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in those outside the cap, they will face a more stringent reduction of approximately 27% over 1990 
levels. The EU Commission has also stated that it would increase to 30% its GHG reductions over 1990 
levels by 2020 if other developed nations adopt comparable targets.  With respect to 2050, the EU 
Commission has adopted a target of reducing domestic GHGs by 80% over 1990 levels.    
 During the first compliance period (2005-2007) cap-setting and allocation in the EU ETS was a 
bottom-up process whereby each member state developed a National Allocation Plan (NAP) using 
guidance criteria from the EU Commission (Ellerman, Convery, & de Perthuis, 2010:32).  These plans, 
which articulated the number of emissions that the member state would allocate, were then submitted 
to the Commission who had the right to reject an NAP if it was determined to be incompatible with 
criteria set out in the Directive. Given that the objective for the first period was to establish market 
infrastructure and institutions and not explicitly to reduce emissions, the cap was closely tied to 
expected business-as-usual (BAU) emissions (ibid:36).  It is important to note here the role of the EU 
Commission in reviewing member-state NAPs.  The Commission required reductions totaling 4.3% of 
what would have been the EU cap (ibid: 42), thus decreasing the surplus in allowances to 4% above 
actual emissions.   
 In the second compliance phase (2008-2012) the EU ETS became the primary instrument for 
achieving Europe's Kyoto Protocol commitments, and thus the Commission took a more assertive 
approach in its negotiations with member states on their NAPs.   The Commission rejected nine Eastern 
European member state NAPs in the second round, reducing the aggregate cap proposed by member 
states by 10% to 2083mt. In spite of the more assertive approach taken by the European Commission, 
preliminary analyses suggest that phase II of the EU ETS will not deliver domestic European emissions 
abatement (Morris & Worthington, 2010).  While the second phase cap was set at 6% below 2005 
emissions, the recession that hit Europe in 2009 reduced emissions significantly. Thus, even with 
economic recovery over the final years of phase II (2010-2012), the European Commission has estimated 
that between 5-8% (500-800 million EUA’s) of phase II allowances will be banked for use in phase III. This 
excess in EUA’s, when coupled with a carry-over of nearly 800m unused offset credits from phase II to 
phase III (D'Oultremont, 2010) and an additional 300 million offset credits to be made available in phase 
III, means that carbon emissions in the EU could continue to grow with no need for domestic abatement 
until late in phase III (Sandbag Consultancy, 2010).   
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 For the third phase of the EU ETS (2013-2020), the EU Commission has set an initial cap of 2.039 
billion allowances for 2013 which will decline linearly by 1.74% over the period so that the 2020 cap will 
be consistent with the EU 20% reduction target.  This amount includes the additional sectors (i.e. 
aluminum) and gases (e.g. nitrous oxide) to which the cap will apply in the third phase which extends 
the coverage of the scheme from 40% to 43% of total EU GHG emissions (D'Oultremont, 2010).  
Emissions from civil aviation will also be included in the EU ETS from 2012, and the EU will consider 
including maritime shipping emissions if no international agreement is reached (EU Commission, 2010b). 
Aside from the wider cap, one of the main changes to cap-setting in the EU ETS is the replacement of the 
decentralized process of aggregated member state NAPs that characterized the first and second rounds 
to a centralized EU-wide cap determined by the EU Commission.  This harmonized approach to cap-
setting is expected to avoid the problems encountered in the first and second rounds where member 
states were able to submit cap proposals in their NAPs that, when aggregated to form an EU cap, led to 
over-allocation and thus an insufficient carbon price to incentivize emission reductions.  
 
3.2. Cap-Setting in Ontario/Western Climate Initiative 
 As described in the introductory section, Ontario has set a set of three targets over the period to 
2050, all based on the 1990 baseline adopted for the Kyoto Protocol:  
Year Change (% of 1990 baseline) Overall emissions (mt CO2e) 
1990 N/A) 176 
2014 -6% 166 
2020 -15% 150 
2050 -80% 35 
Source: Government of Ontario (2007) 
In harmonizing its approach to cap-and-trade with the Western Climate Initiative, from 2012-
2015 Ontario’s cap-and-trade system will cover emissions from electricity generation and industrial 
sources (downstream) that emit more than 25 kt of CO2e.  In the second phase (2015-2020), Ontario’s 
cap-and-trade system will expand to cover suppliers of fuels for transportation, residential, commercial, 
institutional and small industries (T‐RCI).  Thus, in the first phase the cap-and-trade system will cover 
approximately 40% of Ontario’s, and in the second phase it would expand to capture approximately 90% 
(based on Canada's 2009 National Inventory Report Data).  The overall emission limit for the WCI is the 
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sum of each partner jurisdiction’s allowance budget and will decline annually to meet the regional goal 
of reducing emissions by 15% of 2005 levels by 2020.  In this regard, the WCI design is similar to that of 
the EU ETS in the first and second phases in that cap-setting is decentralized to the sub-regional level.        
 With respect to consistency with the overall goal of limiting global temperature rise to 2⁰C, 
Ontario’s GHG reduction targets fall short of what is required.  Its long-term target (80% by 2050) is on 
the low-end of what IPCC modeling indicates is necessary for a developed jurisdiction (i.e. 80-95%). 
Complicating this picture, the Government has not specified the proportion of these emission reductions 
that will occur domestically. Access to international carbon markets for capped sectors would make 
domestic reductions less than 80%, supplanted by potentially dubious international offsets.  In order to 
increase the stringency of the cap, the government could increase the stringency of the long-term cap to 
a 95% reduction and specify that at least 80% of those reductions be met domestically.   
 With regards to Ontario’s near and mid-term caps, there is a fundamental disconnect between 
them and IPCC recommendations for mid-term targets (-25% to -40% of 1990 levels by 2020) (IPCC, 
2007: 776).  Given that the majority of Ontario’s 2020 target will be met by one policy (the phase-out of 
coal electricity) and that offset credits will be available for up to 49% of overall reductions, Ontario 
appears to be effectively delaying aggressive cross-sectoral emission reductions until after the 2020 
period.  This picture is made worse still by the fact that the overall WCI target is for a GHG reduction of 
15% over 2005 levels as opposed to the 1990 levels upon which Ontario’s cap is set.  Thus while Ontario 
may succeed in reducing its domestic emissions by 15% over 1990 levels, its relatively more ambitious 
targets will provide extra space under the overall WCI-cap for other jurisdictions to increase their 
emissions, or to not reduce them as much.  Futhermore, with the WCI regional goal being less ambitious 
than Ontario's the carbon price will be lower which reduces the incentive to deploy low-carbon 
technology early in the climate mitigation effort, and thus also the reduces the dynamic efficiency of the 
program over time.    
 Another potential problem with cap-setting in the ON/WCI ETS is its decentralized nature and 
the lack of a central authoritative institution.  In the EU ETS phases 1 and 2 the decentralized approach 
to cap-setting proved to be a problem as individual jurisdictions had an incentive to increase their 
estimates of business-as-usual emissions in order to inflate their own cap.  This has resulted in absolute 
over-allocation in the first phase  (Ellerman & Buchner, 2008) and early over-allocation for subsequent 
phases as banked emissions are carried from the second to third phases  (McAllister, 2009).  This 
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problem was partially mitigated by the EU Commission who acted to reduce the emissions allocations 
proposed by several member states in both the first and second rounds, and has been fully mitigated for 
the third phase due to the centralization of cap-setting at the EU-level.  The WCI takes a similar 
decentralized approach as the EU ETS phase 1&2, but without having a central authority invested with 
the power to revise down allocation budgets to ensure consistency with the regional target.  
Reputational sanctions are the only ones available to member jurisdictions who feel that another has 
compromised the environmental effectiveness of the scheme by setting their emissions caps to high and 
over-allocating to domestic industries (personal communication, February 2011). Indeed, with the WCI 
based on a rather informal set of memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between partner 
jurisdictions, it is hard to envision what measures beyond naming-and-shaming the WCI can use to 
sanction over-generous jurisdictions.   
 
3.3. Conclusions & Recommendations 
 In conclusion, Ontario’s GHG emission caps are not set sufficiently stringent enough to have a 
fair chance of avoiding a greater than 2⁰C warming by 2100 and are not sufficiently aggressive enough in 
the near/mid-term to incentivize the rapid deployment of low carbon technologies that would make the 
emissions trading scheme dynamically efficient over the period to 2050. As the Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario recommends in its 2010 Annual Greenhouse Gas report, “the Ontario 
government undertake a formal public review of its CCAP GHG targets in light of scientific evidence 
indicating concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere are unacceptably high” (Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario, 2010a: 11).  
 In addition to increasing the stringency of its own GHG emissions caps, the Ontario government 
should also engage in negotiations with its WCI partners to enhance the centralized authority of the 
regional program.  A centralized authority vested with the power to revise the emissions caps of 
member jurisdictions, much like the role played by the European Commission in Europe's ETS, would 
help to ensure that Ontario's more ambitious targets and reductions do not result in GHG emissions 
increases elsewhere.  Absent such an authority, reputational sanctions are the only enforcement 
measures available.  Given that policymakers across the WCI region will face pressure to relax their 
emission caps to protect domestic industrial interests, the environmental effectiveness of Ontario's 
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actions would be compromised, and as such the Province should reconsider its participation in the 
program.  
Recommendations 
 Ontario should revise its 2020 and 2050 caps to be consistent with IPCC recommendations for 
emissions reductions from developed economies.  These revised caps should stipulate that a 
significant majority (i.e. >80%) of emissions reductions occur domestically 
 Ontario should negotiate with its WCI partners to develop a centralized institution with the 
authority to review and revise proposed partner jurisdiction allowance budgets so that over-
allocation in one part of the region doesn't compromise the efforts of others.  
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4. Allowance Allocation 
 Once a cap has been set for an emissions trading system (ETS) a pool of allowances are created 
that correspond to the total amount of emissions permitted in a given period.  In order to meet the 
environmental goals of the ETS, the number of allowances should decline over time to reduce the 
emissions at industries covered by the cap to the desired level.  While this seems rather straightforward, 
there is a fundamentally important question to be resolved by the regulator: how to allocate emissions 
allowances? Given that they are effectively property rights that can have considerable value to society, 
the question of how and to whom emissions allowances should be allocated has significant implications. 
This section will evaluate Ontario’s options for allocating emissions allowances with a view to ensuring 
the environmental effectiveness and fairness of the cap-and-trade scheme.  
 
4.1. Approaches to allowance allocation 
 In cap-and-trade programs there are a number of different approaches to allocating emissions 
permits.  The most common approach used to date is to provide permits for free to industrial 
installations covered by the scheme on the basis of prior use (Woerdman et al., 2008).  This method, 
referred to as “grandfathering” emissions permits, is common in the areas of land use regulation, 
natural resource management (i.e. fisheries quotas) as well as cap-and-trade systems (e.g. US Acid Rain 
program).  There are several reasons that might explain a government’s decision to resort to such a 
system; with the most important being the desire to enhance political acceptability of an ETS among 
politically-powerful regulated firms (Tietenberg et al., 1999). While there are many good reasons why a 
regulator may want to distribute allowances in such a fashion, the incentives it provides for regulated 
entities to increase their use of the resource in question (in the case of climate policy GHG emissions in 
the atmosphere) in advance of the program so that they are awarded greater access contributes to a 
“locking-in” of emissions intensive infrastructure rather than incentivizing a shift towards low-carbon 
technologies that is the putative goal of an ETS (Egenhofer & Fujiwara, 2005).   
 Another major reason why policy-makers may wish to provide emission allowances freely to 
regulated sectors is to avoid a decline in domestic competitiveness relative to international jurisdictions 
that lack a commensurate carbon pricing policy.  In order to avoid the perverse incentives described 
above while maintaining the competitiveness of domestic industries, free allocation on the basis of 
performance benchmarks has emerged as a preferred method for policy-makers (Egenhofer & Georgiev, 
2010).  Performance benchmarks are established at the sectoral or sub sectoral-level and are used to 
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achieve a ‘fair’ distribution of allowances.  When benchmarks are output-based, two facilities with a 
given level of production will receive the same amount of allowances based on a GHG efficiency 
benchmark.  In this scenario, the more efficient producer will receive a proportionally greater amount of 
allowances relative to their demand.  Given that the ETS establishes a price for emissions allowances, 
allocation on the basis of performance benchmarks incentivizes lower carbon production.  These 
benchmarks are updated over time to reflect changes in the average emissions intensities across a given 
sector or sub-sector.  
 If a cap-and-trade system is designed around a public ownership perspective where the 
“atmospheric commons” is considered a global public good then emissions allowances can be auctioned 
and thus generate government revenue that can be used for publicly desirable aims (Raymond, 2010).  
Such a design perspective is also more congruent with the “polluter pays” principle than free allocation 
(either by grandfathering or performance benchmarks) and thus satisfies an important international 
environmental norm (Egenhofer & Fujiwara, 2006: 26).    
 Recent experience in the EU ETS has led to extensive analysis and evidence that has 
demonstrated the superiority of auctioning over free allocation due to better performance of the former 
on considerations of efficiency, equity and innovation which typically are central goals of a cap-and-
trade program (Hepburn, 2006).  With respect to efficiency, free allocation of valuable emissions rights 
doesn’t allow the Government to collect revenue that can be used to reduce other taxes (i.e. labour 
and/or income taxes) thereby recycling the value of the carbon permits back into the economy.  Equity 
considerations represent another weakness of free allocation relative to auctioning because providing 
large profitable companies with a free asset (emissions permit) increases their share prices which in turn 
benefits wealthy shareholding households.   
 In contrast, if emissions permits are auctioned public funds are generated that can be used to 
compensate poor households for increases in energy prices or to reduce distortionary taxes on labour 
and corporations that discourage productivity enhancing investments (Sustainable Prosperity, 2011). 
With respect to innovation incentives, if future allocation decisions are to be made on the basis of 
present emission levels, firms have the perverse incentive to increase emissions now in order to qualify 
for more free permits in the future. Similarly if allocation to existing installations is more generous than 
new entrants to a particular industry, incentives are created to extend the lifetime of carbon-intensive 
infrastructure in order to maintain free permit allocations.   
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4.2. Allocation in the EU ETS 
 
4.2.1. EU Phase I & II – Grandfathered free allocation    
 While auctioning has been shown to be superior to free allocation as a method of distributing 
allowances, and performance benchmarking superior to grandfathering if free allocation is chosen, the 
use of these methods in cap-and-trade programs to date is the exception.  This is largely the result of 
political economic realities, namely the strength of carbon-intensive corporate lobbies in the 
environmental policy process (Hepburn, 2006).   
 In the EU ETS member states were given the option of auctioning up to 5% of total allowances in 
the first round and 10% in the second but few member states took advantage of it (only 0.13% of 
allowances were auctioned in the first phase, rising to 3% in the second phase) (Ellerman, Convery, & de 
Perthuis, 2010: 62). While there were some powerful reasons for member states to freely allocate 
allowances in the initial stages of the program, namely building political acceptance among regulated 
industries and providing compensation to those who had made prior investments in CO2 intensive 
infrastructure, it’s consequences that have created problems for the political acceptability of the 
program among EU citizens (ibid: 86).  
 The most prominent consequence of free allocation emerged in the liberalized European 
electricity sector where private generators were able to pass on the value of freely allocated carbon 
permits to consumers. This financial effect allowed electricity generators to reap windfall profits from 
their free allocations, particularly in Germany and the UK.  While both Germany and the UK increased 
their use of auctioning from 0% in the first phase to 8.8% and 7% respectively in the second phase, 
significant windfall profits are still predicted to accrue to electricity generators in the 2008-2012 period 
(Point Carbon, 2008). Indeed given an average phase II carbon price of €21, analysis by Point Carbon 
suggests that UK generators would reap a windfall profit of between 6-10€bn while German electricity 
generators would reap 14-20€bn (phase II EUA prices have thus far fluctuated between €30 and €10).  
 
4.2.2. EU Phase III - Increased Auctioning and Performance Benchmarks   
 Given the EU's experience with the first and second phases of its ETS, a revised ETS directive was 
approved in December 2008 that made fundamental changes to the cap-setting and allocation 
procedures for the 2013-2020 period (European Union, 2008).  With respect to allocation, the new 
directive will move towards full auctioning of allowances by 2020. The electricity sector will be subject 
to full auctioning by 2013, while non-power sectors will see their free allocations phased out over the 
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period (note that sectors considered at risk of carbon leakage could continue to receive free allowances) 
(Ellerman, Convery, & de Perthuis, 2010: 76). In addition, the Directive strongly encourages the use of 
auction revenues for climate-related purposes without imposing a requirement on member states. 
Another important change relates to the method of determining free allocations.  While in the first and 
second phases free allocations were determined on the basis of historical emission rates (i.e. 
grandfathering), in the third phase they will be made on the basis of ex ante performance benchmarks 
set at the 10% most carbon-efficient installations in sectors or sub-sectors  (Egenhofer & Georgiev, 
2010).  
 Performance benchmarking offers the prospect of enhanced fairness, effectiveness and 
efficiency relative to grandfathering.  Fairness is enhanced because performance benchmarking is more 
consistent with the polluter pays principle, an important norm in environmental law and policy 
(Cameron and Abouchar, 1991).  Performance benchmarking is also more efficient and effective because 
it incentivizes the deployment of low carbon technology and thus can reduce overall costs over a longer 
period and thus make greater emissions reductions more feasible.   
  While benchmarking does have notable benefits compared with grandfathered free allocations, 
it is administratively and technically complex which can create challenges for policy makers.   Indeed, 
benchmarked allocation requires regulators to develop an emissions standard and gather data on past 
or expected production. The heterogeneity of production processes within sectors means that emission 
rates can vary widely between competitors. Within the cement sector for example, several different 
production processes (i.e. dry-kiln, wet-kiln) result in different emissions intensities which makes the 
development of performance benchmarks a technically complex process. Complicating the process is 
the need to update the performance benchmarks over time as the emissions intensity of the sector 
declines.  
 The principle challenges in developing emissions benchmarks include: data collection and 
availability, acceptance by industry, and independent verification.  In the EU these challenges have 
largely been overcome.  Data collection and availability has been enhanced significantly by industry 
experience with the EU ETS over the past five years and by extensive stakeholder consultations between 
government and industrial associations in setting benchmarks.  Furthermore, the EU has been able to 
build on the experience of existing schemes at the member state level in the Netherlands and Belgium in 
developing its benchmarks. With respect to industry acceptance, alternatives (i.e. grandfathering) to 
benchmarking are far less acceptable to governments and other stakeholders given the experience in 
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phase I&II with over-allocation and windfall profits. Thus, given the alternative of procuring all emissions 
permits through auctions, industrial actors have accepted performance benchmarking as the basis for 
free allocations.  Monitoring, reporting and verification methodologies are well established, and a highly 
experienced verification industry has developed alongside the EU ETS. For all of these reasons, the EU is 
well-positioned to develop performance benchmarks for the industrial sectors covered by the ETS. 
 Other major changes to the EU ETS allocation procedures involve the harmonization of 
allocation processes at the community rather than state-level.  Whereas in EU ETS phases I&II each 
member state determined how it would freely allocate allowances and conduct auctions, in phase III 
free allocation will be determined on a community-wide basis and auctions will be conducted on a 
community-wide platform.  This harmonization of allocation will help meet the objectives of cost-
efficiency, transparency, and non-discrimination between companies in the same industry but located in 
different member states.     
 
4.3. Allocation in ON/WCI ETS 
The initial design recommendations for the WCI released in September 2008 stated: 
 
“Consistent with applicable state and provincial law, the WCI Partner jurisdictions will auction a 
minimum of 10% of the allowance budget in the first compliance period beginning in 2012. This 
minimum percentage will increase to 25% in 2020. The WCI Partner jurisdictions aspire to a 
higher auction percentage over time, possibly to 100%.”  (Western Climate Initiative, 2008) 
 
 This recommendation is not found in the final WCI design document released in July 2010 which 
instead states that the method of allowance distribution will be left to each partner jurisdiction to 
decide (Western Climate Initiative, 2010).  This represents a significant back-pedaling on the stringency 
of the WCI scheme, which was presumably necessary in order to maintain political support for it among 
member jurisdictions and affected stakeholders. With respect to the method of determining free 
allocations, the WCI recommends that partner jurisdictions establish performance benchmarks that are 
harmonized across the WCI region to avoid negative competitiveness effects on energy intensive trade 
exposed (EITI) industries (Western Climate Initiative, 2010: 14).   
 Ontario has yet to specify publicly the approach that it will take to allocating emission permits. 
Nonetheless, interviews undertaken as part of the research for this report suggest that Ontario will 
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auction the 10% minimum recommended in the initial WCI design recommendations to the electricity 
sector with the remaining 90% allocated freely to industrial emitters on the basis of performance 
benchmarks (personal communication, February 2011).  The Province hosted a joint GHG benchmarking 
workshop with officials from Quebec in September 2009 that included representatives from the 
aluminum, steel, cement, pulp & paper and petroleum refining industries, none of which were prima 
facie against performance benchmarking as an allocation method (see table below).   
Sector Summary of Input 
Cement Uniform Canadian cement performance 
benchmark, initially for ON, BC, QC. 
Steel Recommend performance-based benchmarks, 
removing impacts of feedstock choice and 
sale/purchase of intermediate products 
Aluminum N/A – no recommended approach 
Pulp & Paper Site-specific benchmarks preferred, second-order 
preference for harmonized benchmarks to achieve 
equivalency across Canada 
Petroleum refining Supports benchmarking, but complexity of refining 
industry processes needs to be taken into account 
(i.e. multiple performance benchmarks for the 
sector) 
Source:  (Ontario Ministry of Environment, 2008) 
 The Ontario government is negotiating with industry officials to determine the level of free 
allocations to each respective installation (ibid). 
 
4.4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 While full auctioning of emissions allowances is the most environmentally effective, cost 
efficient, fair and transparent method of allocating scarce rights to emit carbon, the political economy of 
climate change in a world of uneven policy makes this option unpalatable for politicians, particularly in 
the early stages of a cap-and-trade program when the impacts on employment and domestic 
competitiveness are unclear. The strength of the industrial lobby combined with real fears over negative 
economic impacts has meant that in almost every jurisdiction that has embarked on a cap-and-trade 
program free allocation has been the primary method of distributing the economic rents that accrue.  
However, this has begun to change recently as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the U.S. 
Northeast has introduced full auctioning, albeit only for the electricity sector, and the European Union is 
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phasing in greater levels of full auctioning for its economy-wide cap-and-trade program over the next 
decade.  
 Auctioning of the right to pollute is consistent with public ownership over the atmospheric 
commons. Its acceptance in extant cap-and-trade programs provides an opportunity for Ontario to do 
the same with its proposed program. The revenue generated from full auctioning of emissions permits 
in the first phase of Ontario's proposed program would be close to $2 billion dollars/year at an 
allowance price of $30 (rising to more than $4 billion in the second phase from 2015-2020).  Given the 
severe budget constraints facing the province over the next decade, this significant new source of 
revenue could make an important contribution to maintaining public services and supporting the 
transition to a low-carbon economy.   
 
Recommendations:  
 Ontario should strive to auction 100% of allowances, particularly in phase II of its cap-and-trade 
program when industrial facilities will have had time to adapt to a carbon price 
 Stringent performance benchmarks (i.e. 10% best in a given sector) set at the national or WCI-
regional scale should be used in the interim until full auctioning of emission allowances is 
politically/economically feasible 
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5. Offsets 
 As Ontario moves forward with the development of its cap-and-trade system, a key piece of 
missing regulation is that defining the types of GHG offset projects able to generate credits, and the 
criteria that determine their eligibility. Offset projects originate in sectors that are not subject to 
mandatory emission reductions under a cap-and-trade regime and generate credits when they reduce or 
sequester GHG emissions beyond a predetermined baseline.  These credits can then be sold to firms 
with a compliance obligation under the cap-and-trade regime in order to satisfy their emissions 
reduction requirements.  Offset credits are attractive to firms subject to cap-and-trade regulation 
because they offer an opportunity to comply by paying for lower cost reductions/sequestrations in other 
sectors in lieu of pursuing typically higher cost internal abatement opportunities.      
 The reduced costs and widened constituency of participants make an offset program attractive 
for policymakers designing a cap-and-trade system because it helps to build political acceptance among 
affected stakeholders and lower near-term economic costs.  But, while offsets are important in this 
regard, there are legitimate credibility concerns that arise when one tonne of offset credits do not 
translate into a tonne of real reductions, either intentionally because of fraud or unintentionally 
because of measurement errors.  Further legitimacy concerns arise with offset credits because their 
availability reduces the incentive for capped sectors to invest in low carbon reduction opportunities.   In 
the former (i.e. a tonne doesn’t equal a tonne) environmental integrity of the system is compromised, 
and in the latter (reduced incentives for low carbon investment) dynamic efficiency of the system is 
compromised and long-run costs are increased.   Mitigating these concerns requires astute attention to 
the design of the offset program.  Key elements to consider in this regard include: limits on offset use for 
compliance, potential offset project types and sources, geographic limits, credit for early action, and the 
discounting of offset credits. 
 This chapter will examine offset program design in cap-and-trade systems in order to provide 
recommendations to the Province of Ontario as it goes about developing its domestic scheme.  The 
recommendations will be focused on design elements that can help maintain environmental integrity of 
the overall cap-and-trade program.  While the Province has yet to release a proposed regulation on 
offsets, it will likely follow the proposed design of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) of which it is a 
partner.   The chapter will start with a general description of carbon offsets and the role they have 
played in the EU ETS to date.  From there a description of the proposed offset system design released by 
the WCI in July 2010 and the more recent proposals by California and B.C. for their domestic offset 
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systems will be presented.  This will lead into a discussion of the potential for offsets in Ontario, and the 
role that they might play as a compliance instrument.  Critical to this discussion will be an assessment of 
the effect that offsets might have on the amount of domestic abatement pursued by the industrial and 
electricity sectors in Ontario.  Another critical element will be a discussion of the sustainability 
implications of Ontario offsets derived from two sectors likely to be major suppliers: agriculture and 
forestry.  The concluding section will provide recommendations to Ontario policymakers working to 
develop the Province’s offset program.    
      
5.1. What are greenhouse gas offsets? 
 Greenhouse gas (GHG) or “carbon” offsets are created when a project or activity reduces, 
avoids, or sequesters emissions.  These offsets can then be sold to another party to satisfy an emission 
reduction requirement under a compliance cap-and-trade regime, or to meet voluntary emission 
reduction commitments.  Under a cap-and-trade regime, covered entities may wish to purchase carbon 
offsets if they are less expensive than internal abatement and thus reduce overall compliance costs.   
While the criteria for generating a carbon offset varies depending on the standard used, there are five 
commonly agreed upon criteria that an offset credit must meet to ensure environmental integrity 
(Goodward & Kelly, 2010):  
 
 Real: In order to qualify as “real” an offset certificate must represent the removal or reduction 
in GHGs from a clearly defined action or decision, and quantified using accurate and conservative 
methodologies that account for GHG sources and sinks and leakage risks.  Accurate emissions 
reduction accounting needs to consider increases in emissions that could occur outside the project 
scope as a result of the activity, for instance when increased production costs decrease the relative 
market share of a producer implementing an offset project and thus increase production at 
relatively more carbon-intensive operations (an effect referred to as “market leakage”).   
 
 Permanent: Offset credits must be sourced from projects that result in permanent emission 
reductions or sequestrations.  This is most often a consideration in land-use change and forestry 
projects where there is a risk that sequestered carbon could be reversed unintentionally by natural 
causes or intentionally by human activities.  In order to ensure that offset credits from such projects 
do represent permanent emission sequestrations, programs typically require annual monitoring, 
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reporting and verification (MRV) of carbon stocks at the project site.  In the event of a carbon 
reversal (i.e. a reduction in the project's carbon stock) mechanisms to replace credits, such as a 
buffer account, pro-rating and discounting of credits, and replacement could be employed to 
maintain the atmospheric effect of sequestration projects. 
 
 Additional: In order to be additional, the offset must be in response to the incentives provided 
by the carbon market. Activities that would have happened without such incentives because they 
were legislated, or were financially beneficial without additional carbon market revenue, are not 
considered “additional” to a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario.  This criterion is one of the most 
contentious in offset discussions, because of the subjectivity used in its judgment.  If lax 
additionality standards are in place and BAU activities are awarded offset credits then their use 
allows a net increase in GHG emissions, thus compromising the environmental effectiveness of the 
program.  Additionality can be determined on a project-specific basis or on a performance standard 
basis.  Project-specific additionality tests the proposed project against a BAU scenario and credits 
additional emissions reductions while standardized additionality tests projects of a particular type 
against a consistent set of criteria including whether the project-type is already common practice in 
the jurisdiction (“common practice test”), or whether the project-type would be financially-sound 
without the extra revenue from the carbon market (“investment test”).  Regulatory additionality is 
another important criterion to satisfy, and essentially means that offsets cannot be generated by 
activities that are already proscribed by law. Failure to pass either of these tests disqualifies the 
project from being eligible to generate offset credits. 
    
 Verifiable: A GHG reduction or removal must be objectively reviewed by an independent 
accredited third-party. 
 
 Enforceable: To ensure against double-counting of emissions reductions, offsets are usually 
tracked on a registry that allows program regulators to enforce offset ownership and protect against 
double-counting of emissions reductions.  
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5.2.  Carbon Offsets in the EU ETS 
 The EU Commission did not develop a complementary offset program for domestic non-capped 
sources of GHGs but instead issued a “linking directive” that made it possible to use credits issued under 
the Kyoto Protocol Flexibility mechanisms (EU Commission, 2004): 
 
 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – The CDM allows industrialized countries to invest in 
emission reductions in developing countries. Once a project is approved by the CDM executive 
board, it generates certified emissions reductions (CERs) that can be imported into the EU for 
compliance purposes in the ETS.  To date more than 440 million CERs have been generated.  
 Joint Implementation (JI) – JI allows developed countries to invest in emissions reductions in 
Annex B countries (i.e. those with an emissions reduction requirement under the Kyoto 
protocol). Most of the projects under this program have been located in Russia, the Ukraine and 
other so-called economies in transition and have generated 28.3 million credits to date. The use 
of this mechanism is becoming more prevalent due to growing demand from facilities covered 
by the EU ETS JI and the pipeline for JI projects contains nearly 300 million credits to be 
delivered by the end of 2012 however (UNEP Risoe, 2011).  JI credits are known as Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs).  
 
The availability and use of CDM & JI credits in the first phase of the EU ETS (2005-2007) was quite 
limited due to a lack of capacity at the CDM’s Executive Board to assess and approve projects, and over-
allocation of allowances that obviated the need to purchase additional credits  (Wettesad, 2008).  
However with the second phase of the EU ETS (2008-2012) in which EU member states were subject to 
Kyoto Protocol reduction targets, the use of CDM and JI credits became much more prevalent (Ellerman, 
Convery, & de Perthuis, 2010:272). Limits on the use of Kyoto flexibility mechanisms were set at 10% of 
the total phase II cap with a view to ensuring at least 50% of the abatement effort remained in the EU 
(CORE, 2011).  Such limits correspond with the ‘supplementarity’ criterion in the Kyoto Protocol, 
whereby the use of foreign credits is to be supplementary to domestic reduction efforts.  While never 
defined precisely, the European Union’s position was that no more than half a signatory’s reduction 
effort could be performed outside of the country (Ellerman, Convery, & de Perthuis, 2010: 50).  In spite 
of this position, the economic recession of 2008-2009 reduced European domestic emissions and the 
need for facilities to purchase additional credits.  With the aggregate EU offset limit based as a 
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percentage of the total cap rather than of required reductions, facilities were able to use cheaper Kyoto 
credits to meet a larger portion of their targets (Sandbag, 2010).  
Access to CDM/JI credits in the second phase had the effect of lowering the cost of compliance with 
the EU ETS because of the cheaper abatement options available through Kyoto credits and because of 
the price spread between EUAs (European Union Allowances) and CER/ERU’s.  The price spread, which 
emerged because of the risk associated with international projects and because of usage limits which 
decreased their demand, created the opportunity for firms to sell EUAs that they would otherwise have 
used for compliance and replace them with cheaper CDM/JI credits up to their proscribed limit 
(Ellerman, Convery, & de Perthuis, 2010:60).  This outcome, referred to as CER swaps, reduced the 
domestic abatement that would otherwise have occurred and thus the overall environmental 
ambitiousness of the EU ETS can be called into question.  
The notion that access to CDM/JI credits reduced the environmental integrity of the EU ETS is 
supported by a number of studies that show a significant number of projects certified by the CDM 
credits were not additional (see above for a definition of this criterion). Indeed, a report prepared for 
the WWF found that 40% of the projects accounting for 20% of the certified reductions were not 
actually additional (Schneider, 2007).  Furthermore, with more than 40% of CDM credits coming from 
the destruction of industrial gases (HFC-23 & N2O) that have been shown to provide perverse incentives 
to increase production in order to generate windfall CDM revenues (Wara, 2007), offset use in the EU 
ETS phase II compromised the environmental effectiveness of the cap-and-trade scheme.   
In phase III of the EU ETS the rules around use of CDM/JI credits have been changed to address 
some of the issues discussed above.   Access to project credits under the Kyoto Protocol from outside 
the EU will be limited to no more than 50% of the reductions required in the EU ETS, and the EU is also 
considering a ban on controversial HFC and N2O reduction projects that constituted the majority of 
credits in phase II (Skjærseth, 2009).  Overall, the criteria for CDM/JI credit usage are broadly consistent 
with the “CDM Gold Standard” criteria developed by a group of NGOs led by the World Wildlife Fund 
(Dornau, 2011).  Thus, while this standard was hitherto only applicable to the voluntary market, it has 
now been institutionalized in the EU ETS system and will also likely affect offset protocol development 
at the international level going forward.     
While these changes will improve the environmental effectiveness of the program, the banking 
provisions available in phase II mean that installations will be able to carry forward CERs and ERUs into 
phase III and thus forestall domestic abatement until late in phase III of the EU ETS.  The chart below 
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shows an increasing use of CDM/JI credits in phase II which will allow installations to bank forward 
credits into phase III: 
 
Source: http://www.sandbag.org.uk/blog/2011/may/2/surge-offsets-eu-ets-2010/  
 
5.3. Carbon Offsets in the Western Climate Initiative Region 
In July 2010 the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) released its final recommendations for an offset 
system that is intended to provide flexible compliance options for entities covered by the regional cap-
and-trade program scheduled to commence in January of 2012.  The operationalization of the offsets 
system will follow the same decentralized approach that the WCI has taken in other areas of the cap-
and-trade system (i.e. cap-setting, allowance allocation, GHG reporting, etc.).  Each individual partner 
jurisdiction will develop its own offset system, defining protocols and providing oversight to third-party 
actors (i.e. verifiers), and deciding which offsets from outside jurisdictions will be eligible for use in their 
domestic system (Western Climate Initiative, 2010).   
Quantitatively it is recommended that compliance entities will be allowed to use offset certificates 
for up to 49% of their emissions reductions obligations, a limit that is estimated to represent 
approximately 5% of overall WCI emissions.  Geographically it is recommended that only offsets from 
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North America be eligible initially, with international offsets being considered for addition later in the 
program.  The WCI has identified projects in agriculture, forestry, and waste management as priorities 
for offset protocol development, although other project types outside the capped sectors in the cap-
and-trade program may also participate subject to review by the WCI based on a set of criteria (ibid).     
The WCI offsetting system is considered a crucial flexibility and cost containment element of the 
overall cap-and-trade program (Western Climate Initiative, 2010c). By allowing capped entities to meet 
their compliance obligations through the purchase of offset credits from non-capped entities, market 
liquidity and cost effectiveness is enhanced.  Furthermore, offset projects can have environmental co-
benefits, such as is the case with afforestation projects that promote biodiversity conservation. 
Economic modeling conducted for the WCI in July 2010 demonstrated the role that offsets can play in 
reducing the overall costs of the program (Western Climate Initiative, 2010a).  This modeling projected 
that offsets would contribute 32% of the overall emissions reductions (see figure below).   
 
With this level of offset use a carbon price of US$33/ton, and overall cost savings totaling more 
than US$100 billion relative to a business-as-usual scenario, has been predicted. Were offsets to be 
excluded from the program, the regional goal of a 15% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 would not 
be achieved without an allowance price of at least $50/tonne (ibid: 9). While the cost saving potential of 
offsets is important, there can be a trade-off with the environmental integrity of the cap-and-trade 
system if offset criteria are defined such that credits are granted for projects that don’t result in real, 
additional, permanent and verifiable emissions reductions.   As was discussed above, this has been the 
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case with a significant number of Kyoto Protocol generated Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
credits, especially with respect to the additionality criterion.  
Achieving a balance between adequate offset supply to contain costs, and environmental 
integrity of the offset system is crucial for the success of the WCI program from both an economic and 
environmental perspective.  With respect to offset supply, there is a high risk that  the program will lack 
adequate liquidity to achieve the regional GHG reduction targets at an acceptable cost, especially given 
that most member jurisdictions (including Ontario) are no longer in a position to participate at the 
program’s inception in 2012 (Erickson et al., 2009).   Thus as the California Air Resources Board (CARB) 
has proceeded with the development of its offset protocols (which will significantly influence the 
eventual shape of other WCI jurisdiction offset protocols); it has faced significant pressure to relax the 
offset eligibility criteria in order to reduce the overall costs of the program (and incidentally its 
environmental integrity).  A discussion on this follows the WCI section.     
 
5.3.1. Protocol Development 
 With respect to the development of offset protocols, WCI intends to build off existing work done 
on offset protocols in the voluntary market and adapt/modify them to satisfy WCI criteria where 
possible.  In this regard the WCI commissioned a review of existing offset protocols in the priority 
project types (agriculture, forestry, and waste management) to determine how well they satisfy WCI 
criteria (real, additional, permanent and verifiable) (Western Climate Initiative, 2010).  The evaluation of 
31 protocols from 11 offset systems found none that correspond to all WCI criteria for offsets. For all 
project types crediting periods and project start dates fail to match up with the WCI criteria.  While 
there are a number of protocols from the CDM (manure management, afforestation & reforestation, 
and compost), and the Climate Action Reserve (CAR) (afforestation & reforestation, forest management, 
forest preservation and conservation, and landfill gas) that were deemed likely to respond to WCI 
criteria without significant modification, a large number of protocols from the Alberta offset system, the 
Chicago Climate Exchange, RGGI, & US EPA Climate Leaders would require significant modification 
(particularly in the area of leakage assessment) to be eligible for inclusion.   
 The WCI has indicated that it will work with the protocols that have scored well in the 
assessment (i.e. CDM and CAR’s forestry protocols) and make amendments where necessary. According 
to WCI officials working on protocol development, one option is to take the protocols that scored well 
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and amend them or take components of different protocols and define a minimum to meet the 
regulatory standards (Washington Department of Ecology, 2010). 
 Another concern with respect to offset supply is the incompatibility of some Canadian protocols 
with WCI criteria.  For example offset projects designed for Alberta’s intensity-based carbon reduction 
scheme will not meet the WCI’s criteria for permanence and leakage, and the Canadian Federal 
Government’s draft offset system design from June 2008 includes several project types (i.e. wind power) 
that are not eligible under WCI’s criteria for additionality. Furthermore, the Climate Action Reserve 
(CAR) protocols that form the basis of those being developed in California are not currently applicable to 
projects in Canada. CAR is planning to adapt three protocols for use in Canada within the next year (the 
Livestock Project Protocol, the Organic Waste Digestion Project Protocol, and the Organic Waste 
Composting Project Protocol) which will help address the lack of Canadian offset protocols, but a lack of 
experience with CAR offset project development and the potentially high transaction costs for 
proponents could pose significant barriers to the development of robust offset supply from Canada in 
the near term.    
 
5.3.2. California Air Resources Board (CARB) Offset Program 
 In the proposed regulation to implement its cap-and-trade program, the California Air Resources 
Board (CARB) has defined four offset project types that are eligible to generate credits under AB-32, 
California’s Global Warming solutions Act. These include: 
 
1. Ozone depleting substances (ODS) projects protocol   
 This protocol (California Air Resources Board, 2010a) can be used to generate offset credits from 
the destruction of ODSs in building foam insulation (CFC-11) and refrigerants (CFC-12) which are 
powerful GHGs (3800 times CO2 for CFC-11 and 8100 times CO2 for CFC-12)2.  While the use of these 
gasses in developed countries has been phased out under the Montreal Protocol, significant amounts 
still exist in older buildings and appliances (UNEP, 2009).  Current practice is to landfill old refrigerators 
and insulation without destroying ODSs which can then leak into the atmosphere over time.  With 
finance provided by the carbon market, the proper disposal of these materials contributes significantly 
                                                          
2 
 
 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 2007. 2.10.2 Direct Warming Potentials.  
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch2s2-10-2.html#table-2-14.  
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to overall GHG reductions. In the case of California it is estimated that ODS offset projects will account 
for 30 million metric tons (MMT) of GHG reductions between 2012 and 2014 and 90 MMT between 
2012 and 2020, amounts equal to 90% of total offset demand (Carbon control news, 2010). 
 The protocol does not cover the destruction of HFC-23 gasses (a by-product of HFC-22 
production).  Destruction of these gasses have been a controversial source of credits under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) because of the perverse incentive that exists to increase production of 
HFC-22 in order to have more HFC-23 to destroy (see EU section above for further discussion).  
 
2. Livestock Manure (digesters) projects protocol 
 This protocol (California Air Resources Board, 2010d) allows projects that capture and destroy 
methane from anaerobic manure treatment to generate offset credits.  Such projects must meet an 
additionality test that includes a performance standard and a regulatory additionality test. The 
performance standard is essentially a common-practice test.  Because less than 1% of dairies in 
California have installed biogas systems to capture methane, this practice is assumed to be above and 
beyond common practice and thus eligible for offset crediting.  Such projects must also meet the 
regulatory additionality requirement that installation of a biogas system is not mandated by law in the 
jurisdiction. With respect to permanence, the project must ultimately result in the destruction of 
captured methane whether it be done on site, or transported for off-site energy use.  
 
3. Urban Forest Projects Protocol  
 This protocol (California Air Resources Board, 2010c) allows local governments and agencies, 
public institutions, utilities, and NGOs to generate offset credits from the management of urban tree 
populations in a way that increases their uptake of CO2.  The protocol assesses additionality using a 
performance standard approach and a regulatory additionality requirement. The performance standard 
identifies a level of performance applicable to urban tree projects (i.e. tree survival rate or # of new 
trees planted per year) that is better than average, or business-as-usual.  If this threshold is met or 
exceeded, then the project proponent satisfies the criterion of additionality. The performance standard 
is set based on a “net tree gain” calculator that measures the difference between trees planted and 
trees removed due to disturbance.  With respect to regulatory additionality, project proponents must 
demonstrate that the trees weren’t planted to satisfy a regulatory requirement.  
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4. Forest Projects Protocol  
 The Forest Offset Protocol ((California Air Resources Board, 2010b) is designed to provide an 
incentive for landowners to undertake forest conservation, conservation-based management, and 
reforestation projects on their land that increases carbon stocks.  Three types of projects are covered by 
the protocol:  
 Reforestation projects – planting trees on land that has not been forested for at least 10 years 
or has been subject to a natural disturbance.  Proving additionality requires a demonstration 
that reforestation of the project area would not be financially viable without carbon offset 
revenue.   
 Improved forest management (IFM) projects – activities that increase carbon stocks on forest 
land. Determining additionality for such projects requires the proponent to set a baseline of 
carbon stocks that takes into account numerous factors.  A common practice test that looks at 
carbon stocks on comparable lands is one such factor.    
 Avoided conversion projects – activities that prevent the conversion of forestland that is at high-
risk of being converted (i.e. development pressure) through a conservation easement or 
transfer to public ownership. Additionality for this project type requires a demonstration that 
conversion is legally permissible, and a real estate appraisal showing that an alternative use has 
significantly higher market value than maintaining the area as forest land.   
 
 Addressing permanence is one of the most important issues with forest carbon offsets because 
of the potential for “reversals” that can occur due to natural (i.e. forest fires, insects, wind storms) or 
human causes.  CARB has addressed this risk by mandating all forest projects to maintain all credited 
emission reductions for 100 years following the issuance of an offset credit.  Proponents must monitor 
carbon stocks and submit annual third-party verified GHG data reports and allow site visits every six 
years of the project’s life (100 years).  In the case of intentional reversals (i.e. over-harvesting, land 
coversion), the project proponent is required to retire sufficient compliance instruments to compensate 
for the reversal.  For unintentional reversals, CARB will maintain a forest buffer account that acts to 
insure proponents from GHG reversals caused by natural causes.  Each project will be required to submit 
a percentage of offset credits to the forest buffer account throughout the project life.  
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5.3.3. Discussion of environmental integrity tradeoffs in the CARB offset 
program 
 Facing significant pressure to relax its cap-and-trade program in order to mitigate perceived 
economic harm from California’s unilateral approach, CARB has taken steps to increase availability of 
offsets in order to reduce costs for covered entities.  It has changed the eligibility date for early action 
offset credits from September 2008 which was proposed in the WCI design to January 1, 2005 under the 
proposed CARB design.  This earlier date allows additional credits to be included in the program.  
Furthermore, CARB has doubled the number of offset credits that a covered entity can use to meet its 
compliance requirements from 4% to 8% of the overall compliance obligation.  As discussed above, the 
original WCI recommendation was to limit offset use to 49% of emissions reductions which was 
estimated to translate into 5% of the overall compliance obligation.  
 In another effort to increase the supply of offsets in California’s cap-and-trade program, CARB 
has expanded its offset program beyond the WCI recommendations to include projects that destroy 
ozone depleting substances (ODS) (see above for a description of such projects).  These projects 
represent a large source of low cost offset projects that would significantly increase supply and lower 
the overall costs of the program.   
 The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is also considering linkage with the CDM market for 
select project-types, and with the emerging international REDD program (reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation) through an memorandum of understanding that California signed 
in 2008 with a group of 14 subnational states and provinces in Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and the U.S. 
known as the Governor’s Climate and Forests Task Force (GCF).  There are significant monitoring, 
reporting, verification and enforcement challenges that would need to be dealt with before linkage with 
both the CDM and REDD can proceed, but this would provide a large potential supply of offset credits 
into California’s (and ultimately the WCI’s) cap-and-trade program.  
 Overall, the environmental integrity of the cap-and-trade program can be called into question as 
a result of these recent changes.  With respect to the change in eligibility date for early action credits, 
the additionality of offset projects undertaken before the WCI began in 2007 is highly questionable.  This 
goes back to the idea that, for an offset project to be additional, it must be in response to the incentive 
provided by the cap-and-trade program.  An argument can be made that a project undertaken in 2007-
2011 was made in response to the program’s expected start in 2012, but the same cannot be said for 
projects initiated before that.   
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 The increase in the portion of a facility’s compliance obligation that can be met by offsets (from 
4% to 8%) similarly compromises the environmental integrity of the program.  Much like in the EU ETS 
system, there remains a real risk that cautious regulators will over-allocate in the initial allowance 
budget which will allow facilities to utilize offsets for a much greater portion of their required reductions 
than intended.  And, because of the banking provisions in California’s program, surplus allowances can 
be carried forward into the second phase which will forestall domestic reductions if over-allocation is 
significant.    
 Finally, with respect to the inclusion of ODS offset credits, there is a legitimate question as to 
whether the carbon market is the best avenue to pursue these emission reduction opportunities.  
Indeed, while banks of ODS chemicals are significant sources of GHGs, feasible regulatory approaches 
outside the carbon market exist such as extended producer responsibility for appliances containing 
them.  In May 2009 the UNEP Secretariat on Funding Opportunities for the Management and 
Destruction of Ozone-Depleting Substances issued a report that recommended against using the  carbon 
market to fund ODS destruction because, “ODS would significantly increase the level of credits 
availability and thereby decrease their value…”  (UNEP, 2009).  
More recently the California Senate passed a bill that would allow the creation of offsets from 
the State’s voluntary energy efficiency programs, distributed electricity generation programs, and 
programs administered by the Public Utilities Commission and the California Energy Commission.  The 
bill passed the State Senate in May, but has since been challenged by environmentalists because it 
would double-count offsets from the electricity sector.  The rule change has been put off for a year to 
provide time to negotiate amendments to the bill (Energy Washington Week, 2011).  
 
5.3.4. B.C. Offset System 
 In November 2007 the British Columbia government passed its Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Targets Act (Government of British Columbia, 2007) into law.  Among other stipulations, it required that 
all B.C. Public sector operations (including schools, hospitals, universities, health authorities and 
government ministries) purchase carbon offsets representing the GHG emissions associated with travel 
by 2010 and with the whole of public sector operations from 2011 onwards.  This latter target is 
estimated to result in public sector demand for offsets of 800,000 to 1,000,000 tonnes per year from 
2011 onwards.   
 40 
 
 In order to support the development of offset projects in the Province, the B.C. Government 
created the Pacific Carbon Trust (PCT), a crown corporation charged with procuring offsets from private 
developers in the Province (Pacific Carbon Trust, 2010).   Already in this early stage of the development 
of B.C.'s offset program there are estimates that the value of the PCT portfolio of validated projects is 
more than $1 billion CDN given a projected WCI offset value of $33/tonne (Hamilton, 2011).  Most of 
these projects are forestry-related and will be developed in accordance with the Province's Forestry 
Carbon Offset Protocol (FCOP) which is expected to be finalized later this year (B.C. Ministry of 
Environment, 2011).   
 Already some controversy has emerged over B.C.'s carbon offset program.  In May of 2011 
Pacific Carbon Trust announced that it would be purchasing 114,000 tonnes of carbon offsets from 
Encana, a large natural gas producer active in the Province (Pacific Carbon Trust, 2011).  The offsets 
were generated after Encana installed new technology at a natural gas formation near Fort Nelson that 
allowed for the elimination of routine natural gas flaring at the project site.  This was the first time that 
the technology has been used in Canada, and is thought to be the first commercial-scale application in 
the world (ibid).  This, along with the fact that natural gas flaring is not currently prohibited under B.C. 
Law, helps the project meet “common-practice” and regulatory additionality criteria.  With respect to 
financial additionality (i.e. whether the project makes financially attractive without offset revenue 
because of reduced energy needs) the picture is unclear because PCT does not disclose what it has paid 
for offsets.  
 While these offsets may meet some if the common criteria for a quality offset, they have 
generated controversy because of the transfer of funds from the public sector to a profitable private 
corporation that occurred as a result of the transaction.  This raises significant equity issues with offset 
projects, as it is likely that large corporations, whether they are in the energy, forestry or agriculture 
industries, will have significantly greater ability to generate offset credits.  Thus, as the B.C. Public sector 
satisfies its climate change commitments by purchasing offset credits, and as energy prices rise in the 
Province as a result of carbon regulations, the controversy surrounding the program is likely to grow.  
 Forestry will undoubtedly be an important area for offset projects in the Province of British 
Columbia, which is reflected in the fact that a Forest Carbon Offset Protocol (pending final release in 
2011) was the first undertaken by the Province as part of its emerging offset program.  The Province has 
already engaged in collaborative efforts with industry and NGOs in the Province to conserve large 
forested areas and has recognized the value of carbon sequestration in its rationale for these 
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undertakings.  One prominent example is the Great Bear Rainforest project, covering 5.4m hectares, 
which will generate at least one million credits per year for a total value of up to $750m over 30 years. 
While the potential for forest carbon offset projects in British Columbia’s forests is likely significant, a 
major barrier will be resolving carbon ownership given the extensive land claims that remain over large 
swaths of the Province.  
 
5.4. Implications for Ontario 
 While carbon offsets represent a tool that can help achieve Ontario’s Climate Change Action 
plan (CCAP) goals by incentivizing emissions reductions outside of the planned cap-and-trade system, 
the Province is far behind other WCI partners, including California and B.C. in creating the required 
market infrastructure and engaging public stakeholders in consultation on proposed offset systems. As 
offset systems in other WCI jurisdictions move forward independent of Ontario, the Province’s power to 
influence the development of the overall WCI offset program will become increasingly limited.  This is a 
particular concern given the emerging environmental integrity issues associated with offsets in both 
California and B.C.   
 Ontario is still in the process of developing its own protocols, having established an expert 
working group on Offsets in 2007, and implemented pilot projects in agriculture and forestry in 2008-09 
(Government of Ontario, 2009).  The Climate Action Reserve (CAR) has initiated efforts to extend the 
applicability of CAR protocols to Canada (Climate Action Reserve, 2010).  Given that these protocols are 
forming the basis of California’s offset protocols, and that WCI analysis has determined them to be most 
adaptable to its criteria, it appears wise for Ontario to consider adapting these to facilitate its 
participation in the WCI program.   
 The potential supply of Ontario offsets is unknown at this time, which makes it difficult to assess 
their contribution to achieving the Province's GHG reduction goals.  The Province’s 50 million tree 
program is projected to sequester 6.6 Mt C02e between now and 2050 which is a small amount given 
Ontario’s annual GHG inventory of 165mt in 2009 (Gleeson, Nielsen, & Parker, 2009).  The 
Environmental Commissioner of Ontario has recommended that the Province increase its afforestation 
program in Southern Ontario to 1 billion native trees (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2010).  
This significantly more ambitious program would sequester more than 132mt CO2e between now and 
2050 based on projections for the 50 million tree program, thus making a larger contribution to the 
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CCAP targets.  The creation of a credible forest carbon offset program with strict criteria for 
permanence, additionality, and verification could help to direct finances to this effort.  
 The potential for land-use change and forestry offsets in Ontario’s Far North is a potentially 
significant opportunity that has been recognized by the provincial government.  The area covers the 
Boreal forest ecozone, and the Hudson Bay lowlands where peat bogs sequester significant stores of 
methane.  The 2010 Far North Act that governs land use planning in the Northern half of the Province, 
sets aside some 225,000km2 of the region for a network of connected protected areas (Government of 
Ontario, 2010).  The carbon sequestration value of this land is explicitly referenced in the Act.  There will 
no doubt be significant barriers to the development of offset projects in this region, most notably 
because the remoteness of the territory makes it difficult to prove that conservation activities are 
additional to business-as-usual. But, as resource development pressure in the region grows, 
opportunities for avoided conversion projects may become available.  Before any such activity occurs 
however, a significant effort will need to be undertaken to enhance the monitoring capacity for land-
based carbon in the region.  The Province’s recent announcement of two monitoring stations in the 
Hudson Bay Lowlands is a good step in this regard (Government of Ontario, 2011: 93).   This monitoring 
capacity will become increasingly important in the future as warming and drying trends lead to more 
intense forest fires that may turn the region into a carbon source rather than a sink.   
 Further south in the Boreal ecozone and the Great Lakes-St Lawrence Forest region, resource 
development, in particular forestry, is much more established.  This makes the potential for offset 
credits more significant because it becomes easier to demonstrate that conservation, afforestation, or 
improved forest management activities are not business-as-usual and are thus resulting in additional 
carbon removals. Efforts to enhance the carbon sequestration in Ontario timberland will no doubt come 
into conflict with plans to convert the Province’s existing coal-fired power plants into biomass 
combustion facilities. The estimated demand from OPG for forest biomass to fuel these plants is 
approximately 2 million oven-dried tonnes (ODT)/year and will be sourced primarily from road side slash 
and unmarketable timber from the Boreal region (Ontario Power Generation, 2011).  The sustainability 
of this approach to Ontario’s forestland is highly questionable, especially considering the near term 
carbon surge that will occur under these scenarios (Mckechnie et al., 2011).  It is in this context that the 
value of forest carbon sequestration through offset project development becomes more salient.  If the 
OPG biomass combustion scenario is considered as a baseline for forest carbon in the region, then the 
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value of carbon sequestered by avoiding this electricity pathway could be realized through the offset 
market.   
 Another offset initiative that poses environmental integrity concerns is the Ontario Power 
Authority’s (OPA) planned pilot sale of environmental attributes (EAs) that was recently directed by the 
Minister of Energy (Ontario Power Authority, 2011).  The OPA has retained EAs through power purchase 
agreements with renewable energy facilities through the FiT and previous Renewable Energy Supply 
(RESOP) program.  These EAs could have value because renewable electricity displaces carbon-producing 
fossil fuel electricity generation on the grid and thus reduces overall GHGs in the Province.  The OPA has 
recognized limitations on the usage of EAs because of the Province’s s pre-existing renewable energy 
and GHG goals which mean that renewable energy offsets do not meet the regulatory additionality test 
(see pg 29 for a discussion on regulatory additionality).  Hence the pilot program will be of limited 
duration (18-months) and only allow the sale of EAs within the Province for voluntary GHG reductions.  
However, given the recent attempts by regulators in California to make the State’s energy efficiency and 
renewable energy programs eligible for offset credit creation in its cap-and-trade program (see pg39-
40), there remains the possibility that Ontario may attempt the same in order to expand offset supply.  
Opening the door to offset sales from initiatives in the electricity sector could lead to further initiatives 
to grant offsets for the Province’s demand-side management (DSM) programs and even presumably the 
Province’s coal phase-out.  The resulting increase in offset supply would significantly reduce the need for 
industrial facilities subject to the cap-and-trade program to reduce their own GHG emissions and thus 
compromise the overall environmental integrity of Ontario’s climate change action plan.    
 
5.5. Conclusions & Recommendations 
 In sum, there is potential for land-use and forestry offsets in Ontario, but a significant amount of 
work needs to be done to develop offset protocols that are relevant for the Province’s diverse regions.  
For example, a forestry offset protocol developed for the slow-growing Boreal zone may not be relevant 
for the Great Lakes St. Lawrence forest region where development pressures are much more significant 
and where the tree growth rate is much faster.  Furthermore, enhanced monitoring of remote forest 
and peatland in the Far North is a necessary first step before such offset projects can begin, as is the 
consultation and consent of First Nations peoples who inhabit the land.       
 The broader question of whether an offset program in Ontario will compromise the 
environmental effectiveness of the Province's climate change program remains salient.  With the 
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Province's 2009 GHG emissions already reaching the 2014 target (although they are likely have 
rebounded in 2010 because of a return to economic growth and a colder winter), the overall 
ambitiousness of Ontario's GHG reduction targets comes into question.  If the targets remain the same 
for 2014 and 2020, then the level of emissions reductions required by Ontario's cap-and-trade system is 
not likely to be significant.  With offsets as a compliance option for up to 50% of a regulated entity's 
emission reduction requirements, the goal of incentivizing investment in low carbon technologies in high 
carbon emitting sectors will not be achieved.  Furthermore, if the Province grants early action credits to 
Ontario Power Generation for having phased-out coal fired power from the electricity mix, the Provincial 
carbon market could be flooded with cheap credits that will further depress the carbon price and hence 
reduce further the incentive for low carbon investments in the industrial and transportation sectors. A 
link with WCI partner carbon markets will provide further access to cheap offset credits (i.e. ODS offsets 
from California), further depressing the carbon price signal. Thus, if the CCAP targets remain the same, 
the Province should consider lowering the number of offset credits that a regulated entity can use and 
retiring any potential credits from the phase-out of coal in order to maintain the price incentive to invest 
in low-carbon technologies. Furthermore, the Province should consider disallowing offset credits from 
ODS projects given that feasible regulatory options exist outside the carbon market to address this stock 
of GHGs.  
 
Recommendations:  
 Ontario should not allow offset credits generated from the destruction of Ozone Depleting 
Substances (ODS) for use in its cap-and-trade system.  Restrictions on the import of such credits 
from WCI partner jurisdiction should be enacted.  
 Ontario should forward with the development of offset protocols, prioritizing ones that have a high 
potential for environmental co-benefits (i.e. biodiversity) in the forestry and agriculture sectors.  
 Ontario should consider limiting the ability to bank forward offset credits to avoid having an 
oversupply in future compliance periods that reduces domestic GHG abatement. 
 Ontario should not allow the creation of offset credits from renewable energy or energy efficiency 
programs or the coal phase-out in its cap-and-trade program.  Furthermore, it should direct 
Provincially-owned entities holding environmental attributes from such programs to immediately 
retire them.    
 45 
 
6. Policy Interaction: Renewable Energy Support 
 Jurisdictions participating in an emissions trading system (ETS) have also enacted 
complementary climate policies that seek to promote electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E).  
While such policies only indirectly affect GHG emissions, they are rationalized because of the significant 
share of total GHG emissions that come from fossil fuel combustion in the electricity sector 
(representing ~25% of global emissions from all sources) (IEA, 2010). Thus it is considered that an 
effective response to climate change will require limiting the production of fossil fuel electricity and 
correspondingly increasing the share of renewable energy (IPCC, 2007). RES-E policies have additional 
rationales beyond the fight against climate change which include the mitigation of local health 
externalities associated with fossil fuel combustion (e.g. smog) and the promotion of local economic 
development in jurisdictions without domestic sources of fossil energy (Philibert, 2011).  
 While a technology-neutral emissions trading system can indirectly incentivize the development 
of RES-E by making GHG-emitting competitors relatively more expensive, jurisdictions wishing to directly 
promote RES-E sources have enacted a range of market-based incentives and quantity based mandates.  
Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are a popular form of RES-E policy that mandates electricity utilities 
to generate a certain percentage of electricity production from renewable sources.  Electricity utilities 
within the jurisdiction then solicit bids for a quantity of RES-E from third-parties that corresponds with 
the RPS mandate.  In jurisdictions with a competitive electricity market, tradable green certificates 
provide utilities with flexible compliance options under the RPS mandate.  Such quantity-based policies 
are popular at the sub-national level in the United States as figure 1 demonstrates.  
Figure 6.1: U.S. States with RPS Requirements 
 
States with RPS 
States with RPS Goals 
Source: (Database of Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, 2011) www.dsireusa.org 
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Another popular form of RES-E deployment support policy is a feed-in tariff (FiT) that combines a 
mandate to electricity utilities to purchase renewable electricity sources with an elevated tariff for such 
sources. RES-E generators are favoured through the availability of long-term contracts that guarantee 
access to the electricity grid and a price higher than that paid to traditional sources of electricity (i.e. 
fossil, nuclear, hydro).  Typically regulators differentiate the tariff between RES-E sources in order to 
incentivize more expensive technologies whose costs are expected to fall due to the learning effects 
associated with increased deployment (i.e. PV solar). FiTs have proven popular in Europe, and have also 
been implemented in Australia, Canada (Ontario), and some U.S. states.  Beyond these quantity-
mandates and market incentives for the deployment of near-market technologies, R&D support for 
unproven technologies represents another important component of RES-E policy portfolios (Fischer & 
Newell, 2008)  
 
6.1. Criticism of RE Incentives 
 While RES-E deployment policies such as RPSs and FiTs have proven popular as part of a suite of 
climate policies centred on an emissions trading system, there are theoretical arguments suggesting that 
their interaction with an ETS can have negative unintended consequences.  For example, given the fixed 
emissions cap mandated by the cap-and-trade policy, the separate promotion of RES-E deployment will 
not lead to additional emissions reductions in the economy unless policy-makers revise the cap 
downwards to account for the introduction of an RPS or FiT (Fischer, C. & Preonas, L., 2010).  Worse,  
Bohringer & Rosendahl (2010) claim that “green promotes the dirtiest” because RES-E support policies 
implemented in conjunction with an ETS lower the carbon price and thus reduce the advantage given to 
efficient natural gas turbines over coal plants.  This occurs because, while RES-E policies work as 
intended to reduce the relative profitability of fossil-fuel generated power and thus reduce the output 
of all fossil-fuel producers, the resulting decrease in the carbon price leads to a second-order effect of 
increased electricity production at the dirtiest sources (i.e. coal).   
 A depressed carbon price has effects beyond the electricity sector as the incentive to invest in 
low carbon technologies is diminished across the economy and thus it is argued that RES-E support 
policies increase the overall cost of GHG mitigation over the long-term (Morris, 2009).  Further criticisms 
regarding the cost-effectiveness of achieving an emissions cap when overlapping GHG and RE policy 
instruments are in place relate to the relatively high cost of abatement through RES-E deployment when 
compared with other options (i.e. energy efficiency) (Dachis and Carr, 2011).  The cost curve chart 
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presented in figure 2 below demonstrates that RES-E from wind, biomass and CCS-coal are far along the 
cost curve (solar PV is even further along the curve and thus doesn’t appear) while energy efficiency 
investments like insulation, lighting and air-conditioning can have negative costs (i.e. they are 
economically-beneficial given current policies and energy costs).   
Figure 6.2: Global Cost Curve for GHG abatement measures 
Source: (Enkvist, Naucler, & Rosander, 2007) 
Thus a jurisdiction covered by an ETS that also implements RES-E support policies might not achieve 
low/negative cost emission reductions as relatively expensive abatement from RES-E deployment 
displaces such opportunities under the cap.  In the case where RES-E would be incentivized by a carbon 
price alone, the presence of additional RE incentives only creates windfall profits for electricity 
generators.   
 
6.2. Support for RE Incentives 
While the criticisms of RES-E support relate to their interaction with an ETS and the carbon price 
distortions that result, policy-makers often have multiple motives for promoting RES-E which often 
include: energy security and price stability, other environmental and health benefits, and local economic 
development (Philibert, 2011).  When these multiple objectives are in place, the inefficient achievement 
of the GHG cap can be justified as a cost of achieving the other objectives.  While these objectives are 
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valid, policymakers should assess other options, such as promoting energy efficiency, which are likely to 
be more effective at realizing all the aforementioned objectives (Philibert, 2011: 9).  
Stronger support for RE support policy comes from the long-term nature of the climate change 
problem and the technological revolution required facilitating the achievement of ambitious global 
emissions reduction targets.  A target of limiting global mean temperature to a level below 2 degrees C 
(compared to pre-industrial levels) has become an internationally-accepted goal which, in light of the 
recognized responsibility attributed to industrialized countries for present GHG-concentrations, requires 
them to reduce their GHG emissions 80-95% by 2050 with the main share achieved by 2030 (IPCC, 
2007).   
Achieving climate stabilization requires an ambitious and broad portfolio of mitigation options that 
includes a significant increase in the global share of renewable energy in the global electricity mix.  
Indeed, the IEA Energy Technology Perspectives 2010 shows that by 2050 renewable energy will need to 
account for 50-75% of global electricity in order for GHG emission targets to be met (IEA, 2010).  
Deploying renewable energy on this scale will require their costs to fall dramatically in order to limit 
overall cost increases and maintain affordability of electricity for the world's poor.  Early deployment of 
renewable energy, supported by RES-E policies, is necessary to drive cost reductions.  Indeed, 
technological development is a cyclical process whereby new technologies deployed in a competitive 
marketplace benefit from “learning-by-doing” effects that can dramatically reduce their costs over time.  
Figure 3 demonstrates this learning effect for all conventional RES-E technologies over the past several 
decades. 
Figure 6.3: Learning Curve for Energy Technologies  
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With a perspective that acknowledges the long-term challenge of transitioning to a low-carbon 
electricity system the additional costs to achieving near-term GHG caps imposed by RES-E policies can 
be justified by the dynamic efficiency that such policies provide over time through learning-by-doing 
effects. Supporting the notion that a mix of policies is required, Fisher and Newell (2008) have 
developed a framework to assess different policy options for reducing GHG emissions.  They find that, 
“an emissions price, although the least costly of policy levers, is significantly more expensive alone than 
when used in combination with optimal knowledge subsidy policies.” Their optimal mix has three 
distinct policy instruments: support to R&D, a carbon price, and RE deployment support.  
Another related element of the long-term view supporting RES-E deployment policies is the 
structural lock-in of fossil-fuel technologies that has developed over the past century.  Under the logic of 
path dependency (Arthur, 1989) the short-term cost advantages of fossil energy over RES-E over the 
past century have locked industrial societies onto a fossil-energy intensive technological path that is 
now proving to have less long-term advantages than the locked-out RES-E technologies.  Neuhoff (2005) 
identifies three characteristics of the electricity sector that make it particularly susceptible to 
technological lock-in.  The first is that new technologies produce the same basic product: electricity, and 
hence they have to compete mainly on price.  This contrasts to other sectors where product 
differentiation is a prime area of distinction.  The second characteristic compounding lock-in is the large-
scale and long-time horizon of electricity investments which creates sunk-costs that make alternative 
investments less attractive in the future.  The third characteristic identified is the difficulty that 
individual private firms have at appropriating the full benefits of learning and R&D. Innovating firms are 
susceptible to a technology “spillover” that allows competitors to free-ride and capture benefits from 
the innovating firm’s investments.   The most obvious example of the lock-in of fossil fuels is direct and 
indirect subsidies.  It is estimated that existing subsidies for fossil fuels total $150-250 billion each year, 
compared with a $33 billion annual investment in renewable energies (Stern, 2006).  In addition to 
subsidies, the market price for fossil fuels does not “internalize” the environmental impacts associated 
with them, creating another “subsidy” that makes investments in renewable energy innovation more 
challenging.  
Incredibly large investments in electricity infrastructure are required to facilitate the development 
of new climate friendly RES-E sources.  Smart grids, which incorporate digital technology with traditional 
transmission infrastructure to better manage demand and incorporate distributed renewable sources of 
electricity, are one of the main areas of such investment.  In the U.S. the roll-out of a smart grid is 
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predicted to cost approximately US$400 billion between now and 2030 and result in benefits of 
approximately US$1.6 trillion, mainly attributable to a reduction in energy consumption (Electric Power 
Research Institute, 2011).    The challenge for governments is thus to initiate a change in the path that 
our energy system develops in over the next few decades through the early deployment of RES-E 
technologies, investments in electricity infrastructure, and R&D efforts that can potentially open new 
technological options (Roehrl & Riahi, 2000). Because an ETS operates as a series of relatively short 
temporal phases (typically 3-5 years), it is not well suited to generating the long-term scarcity signals 
necessary to overcoming the structural lock-in of fossil-energy where investment cycles are several 
decades long.  
 
6.3. Interaction RES-E policies in the EU ETS 
In the first (2005-2007) and second (2008-2012) phases of the EU ETS, electricity producers were 
awarded the majority of their required allowances free of charge on the basis of historical emissions (i.e. 
grandfathered allocation).  Thus low-emission renewable electricity technologies (hydro, nuclear) did not 
receive any permits which provided a perverse incentive to maintain electricity production at carbon 
intensive facilities in order to continue to qualify for valuable emissions allowances.  With respect to the 
interaction between cap-and-trade and RES-E policies in phase I&II, the carbon price was insufficient to 
promote deployment of RES-E.  Indeed, even when EU ETS carbon prices reached a zenith of €30 (C$40) 
in 2008, the increase in electricity prices that it engendered was still insufficient to mobilize the 
deployment of renewable energy technologies or power plants with CCS, the latter of which is expected 
to require a carbon price of at least $40-80US to be economical  (Kuuskraa, 2007).  Thus the EU ETS acts 
as a short to medium-term clearing mechanism for abatement options that are close to the market and 
does not constitute an effective approach to incentivizing RES-E R&D and deployment.  Such an finding is 
corroborated by interviews with German electricity generators conducted in Rogge & Hoffman (2009: 
12), one of whom stated: “The EU ETS...only causes a power price increase, but it does not guide 
investments...In this regard, for example, feed-in-tariffs or the (German) cogeneration law are much 
more successful.” 
For the third phase (2013-2020) the ETS has been revised and strengthened by the introduction of 
an EU-wide cap to replace the disaggregated national-level cap setting of previous phases and the 
immediate phase out of free allowances for the electricity sector (free allowances for other ETS sectors 
will be phased-out over the 2013-2020 period) (Ellerman, Convery, & Perthuis, 2010: 76).  This new 
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approach to cap-setting and allocation should help resolve the perverse incentives to continue operating 
carbon-intensive facilities and thus provide more indirect support to renewables.  
The revised ETS is one component of the European Commission's ‘climate and energy’ directive that 
came into force in 2009.  Linked to the revised ETS is a set low carbon energy policies which collectively 
will lift the average renewable share across the EU to 20% by 2020 (more than double the 2006 level of 
9.2%).   Renewable energy is expected to constitute 30% of total electricity consumption which will be 
achieved through RES-E support policies at the member state level.  EU member states operate a wide 
range of RES-E support schemes including most prominently: feed-in tariffs (Germany, Denmark and 
Spain) and quotas/tradable green permit sytems (Belgium, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the U.K.) (Haas, et 
al., 2011). Additionally, a network of coal-fired carbon capture and storage (CCS) demonstration plants 
will be setup by 2015, with the aim of a commercial update of CCS by around 2020.  
The revised ETS will also support the deployment of advanced RES-E technologies and CCS for coal 
plants through an innovative financing instrument managed jointly by the European Commission, 
European Investment Bank and Member States. 300 million allowances in the EU ETS New Entrants’ 
Reserve (NER) will be set aside for subsidizing installations of innovative renewable energy technology 
and carbon capture and storage (CCS). The allowances will be auctioned on the carbon market 
generating approximately €4bn for an anticipated 20 CCS and 90 RES-E projects across the EU region. In 
linking the ETS with the development of next-generation RES-E technologies, the “NER300” program 
represents an important innovation in cap-and-trade design that reinforces the adoption of ambitious 
climate mitigation targets.     
 
6.4. Interaction RES-E policies in ON/WCI 
In 2009 Ontario's Green Energy and Green Economy Act (GEGEA) was passed which enabled a feed-
in-tariff (FiT) program for RES-E sources.  Ontario's FiT program is the first of its kind in North America 
and will help facilitate the Province's phase-out of coal-fired electricity by 2014.  Ontario's FiT has been 
made contingent on a minimum domestic content of 25% for wind turbines (increasing to 50% after 
2012) and 50% for solar panels (increasing to 60% in 2011).  It is hoped that these requirements will spur 
the development of a local manufacturing industry for RES-E components that will generate thousands 
of jobs to offset the decline of Ontario's traditional manufacturing sectors.  Thus the GEGEA is consistent 
with RES-E policies in other jurisdictions in that there are overlapping objectives of climate mitigation, 
local environmental and health issues, and economic development.   
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Ontario's FiT program is very close in design to that of Germany and Spain, except for that the latter two 
jurisdictions have included a “degression” provision to adjust rates downwards over time to reflect on-
going improvements in technology.  Figure 4 presents a comparison of Ontario's FiT program with those 
of European countries (Germany, Denmark & Spain): 
 
Figure 6.4: Comparison of FiT policies between select jurisdictions  
Source:  (Sustainable Prosperity, 2010) 
 
With Ontario phasing-out its substantial coal-fired electricity capacity (currently 13% of fuel mix at 
time of writing) as part of the GEGEA, an increase in emissions from dirty domestic sources as modeled 
in Bohringer & Rosendahl (2010) will not materialize. But, given that Ontario can import a significant 
amount of electricity from coal-intensive US states like New York and Minnesota, there remains the 
possibility that the interaction of Ontario’s ETS and the FiT could cause some carbon leakage to other 
jurisdictions.  Under the Western Climate Initiative's First Jurisdictional Deliverer (FJD) approach to 
applying the ETS to electricity emissions, imports from non-WCI jurisdictions like New York and 
Minnesota would be subjected to the carbon price through a requirement that importing entities (i.e. 
OPA) hold sufficient allowances to cover the emissions from imported sources.  But, given that FiT 
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induced RES-E deployment will put downward pressure on the WCI carbon price, it is still possible that 
the “green promotes the dirtiest” effect could take place as emissions leak outside of Ontario to non-WCI 
jurisdictions.  This effect could be mitigated if imports from hydropower sources in Manitoba and 
Quebec, both of whom are WCI members, were facilitated through investments in grid interconnection 
capacity.  Recent investments in Ontario-Quebec electricity interconnections are a positive step in this 
regard (Ministry of Energy, 2011). 
 
6.5. Conclusions & Recommendations 
Given the strategic importance of RES-E in addressing climate change over the next few decades, an 
attempt should be made to adjust Ontario’s cap-and-trade policy to take the FiT into account.  This could 
be done by quantifying and reducing from the cap the emissions reductions that result from RES-E 
displacing fossil-energy thus ensuring that the ETS brings about emissions reductions additional to that 
incentivized by the FiT scheme.  Under Ontario’s Climate Change Action Plan the vast majority of 
emission reductions are expected to come from the electricity sector as a result of the coal phase-out 
and no reductions are anticipated in industrial sectors as a result of current CCAP initiatives 
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2010).  A tightening of the cap, facilitated by FiT-induced RES-E 
deployment, would result in a stronger carbon price signal to incentivize low-cost energy efficiency 
investments in Ontario’s industrial sectors .     
Another option would be to adopt a more flexible design that includes a price floor for emissions 
allowances.  The price floor would constitute a de facto carbon tax were the price of emissions 
allowances to fall below the threshold set by regulators.  While they are likely to be challenged by 
politically-powerful industrial groups, price floors are used in both the U.K. and California which suggests 
that such resistance can be overcome.  In California the price floor will be applied as a $10 reserve price 
on auctioned allowances.  This reserve price will increase by the rate of inflation + %5 which, if inflation 
averages 2% over 2012-2020, will result in a ~$17 floor price in 2020. In the U.K. an auction reserve price 
of £16 (~C$25) will be applied for the electricity sector in 2013 which will increase to £30 (~C$46) by 
2020.    Such an approach will also likely apply in the case of British Columbia’s carbon tax, which is 
currently C$20/tonne and applies to fossil fuels purchased in the province.  Under such a hybrid carbon 
tax/cap-and-trade approach, an incentive to invest in RES-E technologies would remain even if permit 
prices under the ETS were to collapse (as has occurred in the EU ETS scheme). 
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Furthermore, the price floor would generate revenues that could be used by the Government to 
finance the FiT scheme, or invest in electricity grid infrastructure to facilitate the inclusion of distributed 
renewable sources.   Yet another option available to support the development and deployment of RES-E 
through Ontario’s ETS is to set-aside allowances for voluntary RES-E purchases.  Such a voluntary RES-E 
set-aside has been contemplated as part of the WCI design, but has been left to the discretion of 
individual partner jurisdictions (Western Climate Initiative, 2010).  By maintaining a bank of allowances 
that can be retired based on the demand for voluntary RES-E purchases, the Government maintains an 
incentive for individuals and businesses to purchase renewable power voluntarily (i.e. bullfrog power).    
 
Recommendations: 
 Ontario should reduce its emissions cap to account for the GHG reductions that are induced by the 
FiT program. The Province’s Long-term electricity Plan (LTEP) projects 10,000MW of new RES-E by 
2018 which translates into a GHG reduction of approximately 10Mt.   
 Ontario should institute a price floor as part of its cap-and-trade program set at $10/tonne and 
rising over time faster than the rate of inflation.  
 Ontario should introduce a set-aside of allowances to maintain the incentive for individuals and 
businesses to voluntarily purchase renewable energy   
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7. Emissions-Intensive Trade-Exposed Industries: Managing 
Carbon Leakage  
In announcing that it would not follow WCI partners in implementing a cap-and-trade program in 
2012, the Ontario government signaled its concern over the industrial competitiveness impacts that 
such a policy could entail (Ontario Ministry of the Environment, 2011).  The concern is that the 
implementation of a cap-and-trade scheme in a world of fragmented or non-existent carbon markets 
will expose Ontario’s emissions-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industrial sectors to higher costs.  In 
a globalized economy, trade-exposed sectors in Ontario could see their market share reduced relative to 
international competitors that are not subject to carbon constraints.  And, even in the case where a 
competing jurisdiction has implemented a carbon price, key differences in program design will result in 
different cost structures for industries. Such will be the case with Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) member states where a carbon cap-and-trade program applies to the electricity sector only.  
Because Ontario’s proposed program applies more broadly to cover industrial sectors, compliance costs 
are likely to be higher and thus these sectors could be put at a competitive disadvantage.  
Beyond the purely economic concerns about reduced competitiveness lie environmental 
effectiveness concerns.  If EITE facilities located in Ontario move to jurisdictions that impose a less 
onerous carbon constraint then the effect of a provincial carbon price is neutralized.  If the production 
processes used in the other jurisdiction result in more GHG emissions then the effect of Ontario’s cap-
and-trade program would be to increase overall global GHG emissions.   This effect is known as carbon 
leakage and provides a powerful argument that the design of a cap-and-trade program should account 
for such unintended consequences on emissions intensive activities.   
While these concerns are important, the overall objective of reducing greenhouse gases should not 
be compromised in responding to them. Given the privileged position of industrial actors within the 
environmental policy process (Macdonald, 2007), regulators designing a cap-and-trade system will face 
significant pressure from emissions-intensive sectors to reduce their costs through measures such as 
free allocations and/or import duties on carbon-intensive products.  While such policy options can 
mitigate the risk of carbon leakage and negative economic impacts, decisions on how to respond should 
be preceded by analysis that determines which sectors are most likely to suffer competitiveness impacts 
and to what degree. This chapter will attempt to do this.  It will start by reviewing the literature to 
understand the extent of the risk of leakage and the sectors that are particularly prone and in need of 
transitional support. This empirical description will facilitate an understanding of the sectors that might 
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be significantly impacted by a cap-and-trade program in Ontario. Having identified the sectors in Ontario 
potentially at risk of negative economic impacts from a carbon price, the chapter will then describe 
policy approaches utilized to mitigate economic harm in the EU ETS and those proposed in the 2010 
American Clean Energy and Security Act and the Australian Carbon Reduction Scheme. With the breadth 
of policy options in mind, the chapter will conclude by making some specific recommendations for the 
Government of Ontario to manage competitiveness and leakage impacts as it designs its cap-and-trade 
program. The recommendations provided will focus on mitigating the short-run economic harm while 
still providing the medium and long-term incentive for these industries to invest in low carbon energy 
solutions.  
 
7.1. Assessing the extent of the risk of carbon leakage  
A significant amount of analysis has been conducted on the issue of how greenhouse gas reduction 
policies could affect industrial competitiveness and employment in a region moving unilaterally without 
corresponding effort from trading partners.  Recognizing that a firm’s adaptation to a carbon price 
occurs over time, the literature on industrial competitiveness effects of carbon pricing differentiates 
between four different timescales: the very short run, the short run, the medium run, and the long run 
(Ho, Morgenstern, & Shih, 2008).  Over time, firms are able to respond to a carbon pricing policy in the 
short-run by raising prices, substituting inputs (i.e. labour for capital), and in the long run by replacing 
capital with more energy-efficient technology.  Thus, over time, the carbon intensity of a firm should 
decline along with competitiveness impacts.   
Broadly speaking, studies assessing competitiveness and leakage impacts of a carbon pricing regime 
have found that the likelihood of carbon leakage has largely been exaggerated in the political debate. 
These impacts are concentrated in a limited number of industries that account for a small portion of 
gross domestic product (GDP) and employment and become less sever over time.  For example, 
Hourcade, et al. (2007) studied the competitiveness impacts on the UK economy of the EU ETS using a 
CO2 price of €20/t and an electricity price of €10/MWh. Their analysis identified cement, iron and steel, 
aluminium, pulp and paper, and chemicals as sectors at risk of competitiveness impacts from the EU ETS 
which combined represent 1.1% of UK GDP and 0.5% of employment. A German study (Graichen, et al. 
2008) reached similar conclusions.  The European Commission in May 2010 released a paper analyzing 
the costs, benefits and options of moving the EU reduction target to 30% below 1990 levels by 2020.  
The paper included an assessment of the risk of carbon leakage in the EU ETS that estimated production 
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losses in the EU would be less than 1% under the 20% target, and less than 2% with the 30% reduction 
target (European Commission, 2010).  Another EU study released by the UK Carbon Trust found the risk 
of carbon leakage in Phase III of the EU ETS to be less than 2% of total EU emissions (30Mt CO2eq).  The 
report did note that for a few specific sectors - such as steel, cement and aluminum – the risk of leakage 
is greater (Carbon Trust, 2010).  
Studies conducted in the U.S. on the competitiveness impacts of cap-and-trade proposals have also 
found small negative impacts. For example, Morgenstern et al. (2008) examine the impacts on U.S. 
industry of a $10/t CO2 charge and find adverse effects on output and employment of less than 1% in the 
near-term.  Over time as these industries adapt by becoming more energy efficient, or substituting 
capital for labour, these adverse effects are largely reversed and some industries actually see 
employment gains (i.e. electric utilities). Negative effects persist for fossil fuel extraction industries and 
petroleum refining. Aldy and Pizer (2009) model the effects of a $15/t CO2 charge and find an average 
production decline of 1.3% across U.S. manufacturing, of which 0.6% is attributable to a decline in 
consumption.  Thus such a carbon charge only results in a 0.7% shift in production overseas, and doesn’t 
result in any discernible impact on employment for the manufacturing sector as a whole. The U.S. EPA in 
December 2009 analyzed the effect of a US$20 carbon price on emissions intensive trade exposed 
industries.  At that time the House of Representatives had passed the Waxman-Markey bill (H.R. 2454) 
and thus the prospects of a domestic cap-and-trade scheme in the U.S. appeared high.  The study found 
that, without industry assistance provisions, the increase in production costs for EITE industries would 
range from less than 0.5% to a little more than 2.5% depending on the sector (Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2009).  
Finally, in Australia the Grattan Institute analyzed the impact of a $35 per tonne carbon price on 
eight emissions intensive industries and found that only two (steel and cement) were at risk of carbon 
leakage.  Based on this finding, the report concluded that much of the protection proposed for EITE 
sectors under the Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme was unnecessary (Grattan Institute, 
2010).     
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7.2. Defining Energy-Intensive and Trade-Exposed Industries in 
Ontario 
Defining EITI sectors in order to provide transitional assistance under a cap-and-trade program is a 
policy decision that first requires setting thresholds for energy intensity and trade exposure.  This has 
been done in the European Union for the third phase of the EU ETS, and in the U.S. as part of the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.  Using the definitions set out in the EU (European 
Union, 2008) and the U.S. proposal (HR2454m 11th Congress, 2009) the list of EITE sectors in Ontario 
could include: mining, pulp and paper, chemicals, cement, steel and petroleum refining.  But the extent 
to which these sectors are vulnerable to competitiveness impacts varies widely, and economic value at 
risk likely represents a small percentage of Gross Provincial Product.   
In the mining industry transitional assistance is likely not warranted.  This is because, while Ontario’s 
mining industry is highly trade-exposed with more than 40% of production exported internationally , 
energy costs represents a relatively small amount of the value of shipments (i.e. >5%) (Ministry of 
Natural Resources, 2011).  This is particularly the case in the present period of high commodity prices. 
And with mining and smelting activities relying primarily on Ontario’s soon-to-be coal free electricity grid 
for their energy needs, the effect of a carbon price is likely to be quite small on the industry’s energy 
costs.  
Pulp and paper is another example of an industry where the case is weak for transitional assistance.  
Like mining, Ontario’s pulp and paper industry is trade-exposed with close to 40% of output sent abroad 
(Natural Resources Canada, 2010a) and nationally the forest sector is the largest industrial energy user 
(Natural Resources Canada, 2010b).  But, the forest industry self-generates more than 50% of its energy 
needs by burning wood biomass in its facilities (Statistics Canada, 2010).  While the net carbon emissions 
of this practice can vary widely depending on the source of forest bio-fibre (Pembina Institute, 2011), 
the Ontario government has amended its Greenhouse Gas Reporting Regulation (O.Reg 452/09) to 
exempt biomass emissions from the determination of whether a facility meets the 25,000 tonne 
threshold for coverage under the cap-and-trade program (Ontario, 2010).  This amendment represents a 
de facto exemption for pulp and paper facilities in the Province from participation in the cap-and-trade 
program which is the most extreme policy option available for protecting a domestic industry.    
The remaining sectors - chemicals, cement, steel and petroleum refining – remain on the list of 
energy intensive trade exposed industries.  Of these four, only the cement and steel sector will be 
further analyzed.  This is because neither the chemical or refining industries are major employers in 
 59 
 
Ontario.  The chemical industry employs just over 1000 people nationally, and only 30% of production 
capacity is located in Ontario (Industry Canada, 2011) and Ontario’s four petroleum refineries employ 
less than 1000 people combined.   The steel and cement sectors both employ a significant number of 
Ontarians (24,000 and 12,500 respectively) and have been consistently recognized in international 
studies as being deserving of transitional assistance under a carbon pricing regime (see the “Assessing 
the extent of the risk of carbon leakage” section above).  Furthermore Ontario is home to a significant 
portion of national productive capacity in each of these sectors.    
  
7.2.1. Cement 
Ontario has seven cement plants that represent 46.5% of total national capacity.  The Province’s 
cement industry is relatively carbon inefficient with two of the seven facilities using a wet process kiln 
technology that consumes up to twice the energy per unit of production as compared to modern dry kiln 
technology (Cook, 2009).  The use of out-dated technology, coupled with a relatively low rate of 
substitution of fossil fuels for alternative fuels (the rate of thermal substitution in Ontario is 5.3% 
compared to a national average of 11.3% and more than 34% in Quebec) (Cement Association of 
Canada, 2010) make Ontario’s cement production more energy & carbon intensive than the Canadian 
and continental average.  Thus as Ontario moves forward with a carbon pricing system, policy levers in 
complementary to cap-and-trade should be considered.  This could include mandating the use of 
alternative energy sources in the clinker production process.  
 
7.2.2. Steel 
Ontario is home to six steel plants that represent approximately 80% of national capacity.  Four 
of these are integrated operations with coke ovens, blast furnaces and basic oxygen furnaces, and two 
operate electric arc furnaces to reprocess scrap steel (Environment Canada, 2010).  As a large energy 
consumer accounting for about 7.5% of Canada’s industrial energy demand (Natural Resources Canada, 
2009) selling an internationally-traded commodity (Canada imports 50% of domestic consumption) 
carbon leakage is an issue in the steel sector. This is particularly the case for Ontario’s relatively 
emissions-intensive blast oxygen furnace plants.  
 
7.3 Policy Options 
There are two basic options for mitigating the risk of leakage within EITE sectors: leveling down 
carbon prices through free allocations or investment subsidies, or leveling up carbon costs through a 
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border carbon adjustment (BCA) on imports (Carbon Trust, 2010).  While free allocation is the favoured 
approach in the EU and the proposed WCI cap-and-trade design, it may not effectively deter leakage if a 
facility can economically reduce output and sell its surplus allowances.  Reduced domestic output that 
results in greater imports from unregulated jurisdictions compromises the environmental effectiveness 
of a carbon pricing policy.  In this situation the EITE facility would generate windfall profits from 
allowance sales while doing little to reduce the emissions leakage that policymakers were seeking to 
avoid.   
A more effective solution from the perspective of economic and environmental efficiency is to level-
up the carbon costs on imported products through a BCA.  Such an approach is particularly suitable for 
the cement sector where the relative homogeneity of product allows for the application of a BCA 
benchmarked to the best-available-technology (e.g. dry kiln technology) that is likely consistent with 
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules of “non-discrimination” and “national treatment”.  With respect 
to steel the heterogeneity of product and process along with the significant economic value of 
internationally traded steel make the establishment of a BCA technically and politically challenging.  
Thus output-based free allocation with a gradual transition towards a BCA or preferably a global sectoral 
agreement might be preferable (Carbon Trust, 2010: 54).   
 
7.4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The practicality of the WCI region developing border carbon adjustments for internationally traded 
products is questionable because of constitutional restrictions in the U.S. that prevent sub-national 
entities from erecting barriers to interprovincial/state trade (Lawrence, 2009).  Thus, given the sub-
national regional approach that Ontario has embarked on for its cap-and-trade program, output-based 
free allocation appears to be a second best alternative.  There are several design elements that should 
be considered when establishing free allocations in order to maintain environmental integrity of the 
overall program.  First among these is that free allocations should be based on the best practice (i.e. 
lowest emissions) producers in the WCI region, much like the EU approach to benchmarking described in 
section four.   Furthermore, the EU does not provide allowances for indirect emissions from electricity 
and limits assistance to the overall industrial sector emissions cap.  As the overall cap declines 
throughout phase III (1.74% per annum 2013-2020) the level of free allocations will decline over time.  
These provisions maintain the incentive for EITE sectors to invest in emissions reductions even while 
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receiving free allocations.  This is because only the best performers will receive 100% of their allowance 
requirements for free, and even those will face declining free allocations over time.    
Going forward, the Ontario government should engage Provincial governments through the 
Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, the Federal government and its North American 
trading partners through the Commission on Environmental Cooperation in an effort to develop national 
and continental sectoral emissions performance benchmarks for the cement and steel sectors.  These 
performance benchmarks should be used to facilitate the development of border carbon adjustments at 
the national and continental levels.  
  
Recommendations: 
 Ontario should establish a sunset provision for the transitional assistance provided to industries 
in its cap-and-trade program.  Preliminary analysis suggests that the steel and cement sectors 
are two likely candidates for transitional assistance, but more extensive economic modeling 
should be conducted to assess the risk in other sectors.  Free allocations, based on a firm’s level 
of output and benchmarked to the best performance within a given sector, should be provided 
on an interim basis until such time that Ontario’s trading partners have developed comparable 
policies.  
 Ontario should engage governments at the sub-national, national and continental level to begin 
the process of developing sectoral performance benchmarks for emissions-intensive trade-
exposed industries.  This effort should be directed towards the development of WTO-compliant 
border carbon adjustments.   
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8. Conclusions  
 
Climate change is happening and Ontario is currently contributing a much larger share of global 
greenhouse gases than it should given its population and the size of its economy.  In order to have a fair 
change of averting catastrophic impacts from climate change, the province will need to reduce its GHG 
emissions by at least 80%, and likely closer to 95%, over the next few decades.  And, the sooner Ontario 
can set itself on a trajectory to reduce emissions the better because of tipping points that could be 
reached in the next several years that would turn provincial GHG sinks such as the Boreal forest in the 
North West and peat bogs in the Hudson Bay Lowlands into major sources of emissions.  Thus emissions 
reductions made in the near-term will ease the transition to a low-carbon economy and reduce the risk 
of uncontrolled releases of GHGs and runaway global warming.   
Pricing carbon is recognized as one of the most important policies for reducing GHGs.  The 
Province has identified cap-and-trade as its favoured approach for pricing carbon, and is in the process 
of developing a system that will be linked with U.S. and Canadian sub-national jurisdictions as part of the 
Western Climate Initiative.  This research paper was concerned with providing recommendations to the 
Province as it goes about developing its cap-and-trade program.  Such an approach is complex, and 
there are significant risks that the program design could compromise the environmental effectiveness of 
Ontario’s climate change mitigation efforts.  In this regard the paper reviewed the European experience 
with emissions trading and found that such a program can be designed to make a contribution to 
climate change mitigation given appropriate attention to the design of key program elements.   Key 
recommendations made on the various cap-and-trade program elements surveyed are as follows:  
 
1. Cap-setting 
 Ontario should revise its 2020 and 2050 caps to be consistent with IPCC recommendations for 
emissions reductions from developed economies.  These revised caps should stipulate that a 
significant majority (i.e. >80%) of emissions reductions occur domestically 
 Ontario should negotiate with its WCI partners to develop a centralized institution with the 
authority to review and revise proposed partner jurisdiction allowance budgets so that over-
allocation in one part of the region doesn't compromise the efforts of others.   
 
2. Allowance allocation 
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 Ontario should strive to auction 100% of allowances, particularly in phase II of its cap-and-trade 
program when industrial facilities will have had time to adapt to a carbon price 
 Ontario should use stringent performance benchmarks (i.e. 10% best in a given sector) set at the 
national or WCI-regional scale in the interim until full auctioning of emission allowances is 
politically/economically feasible 
 
3. Offsets 
 Ontario should not allow offset credits generated from the destruction of Ozone Depleting 
Substances (ODS) for use in its cap-and-trade system.  Restrictions on the import of such credits 
from WCI partner jurisdiction should be enacted.  
 Ontario should forward with the development of offset protocols, prioritizing ones that have a 
high potential for environmental co-benefits (i.e. biodiversity) such as forestry and agriculture.  
 Ontario should consider limiting the ability to bank forward offset credits to avoid having an 
oversupply in future compliance periods that reduces domestic GHG abatement. 
 Ontario should not allow the creation of offset credits from renewable energy or energy 
efficiency programs or the coal phase-out in its cap-and-trade program.  Furthermore, it should 
direct Provincially-owned entities holding environmental attributes from such programs to 
immediately retire them.    
 
4. Interaction effects with complementary regulation  
 Ontario should reduce its emissions cap to account for the GHG reductions that are induced by 
the feed-in-tariff. The Province’s Long-term electricity Plan (LTEP) projects 10,000MW of new 
RES-E by 2018 which translates into a GHG reduction of approximately 10Mt.   
 Ontario should institute a price floor as part of its cap-and-trade program set at $10/tonne and 
rising over time faster than the rate of inflation.  
 Ontario should introduce a set-aside of allowances to maintain the incentive for individuals and 
businesses to voluntarily purchase renewable energy   
 
5. Managing carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns  
 Ontario should limit transitional assistance provided to industries in its cap-and-trade program.  
Preliminary analysis suggests that the steel and cement sectors are two likely candidates, but 
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more extensive economic modeling should be conducted to assess the risk in other sectors.  
Free allocations, based on a firm’s level of output and benchmarked to the best performance 
within a given sector, should be provided on an interim basis until such time that Ontario’s 
trading partners have developed comparable policies.  
 Ontario should engage governments at the sub-national, national and continental level to begin 
the process of developing sectoral performance benchmarks for emissions-intensive trade-
exposed industries.  This effort should be directed towards the development of WTO-compliant 
border carbon adjustments.   
 
At the time of writing (July 2011) the prospects of Ontario moving forward with a cap-and-trade 
program are highly uncertain.  The government has recently delayed the Province’s participation in the 
WCI regional program citing concerns over the competitiveness impacts on Ontario’s industrial sector.  
With the provincial economy challenged by rising energy costs, a high Canadian dollar and international 
competition from low-cost jurisdictions, it is unlikely that these concerns will recede any time soon.  
Furthermore, Ontario’s WCI partners are facing problems of their own in implementing cap-and-trade 
and have responded by compromising the environmental effectiveness of their climate change efforts to 
reduce the potential economic downside.  The California Air Resources Board has expanded offset 
supply beyond the WCI recommendations to ease concerns of negative economic impacts and has also 
delayed implementation of its emissions trading program. In British Columbia a carbon tax is already in 
operation and thus the rationale for an overlapping cap-and-trade program is less clear.  Furthermore 
the province must reconcile the prospect of an emissions-intensive shale gas boom with its climate 
change policy development.  As WCI partners become concerned about the impacts on their domestic 
economies the prospects for an environmentally effective cap-and-trade program premised on 
decentralized governance weaken.   
 In this regard Ontario must keep its policy options open if it hopes to achieve its GHG reduction 
targets in the near and long-term.   Cost-effective near-term opportunities such as the reduction of black 
carbon in the freight transportation and residential heating sector, and the reduction of fugitive 
methane releases in the waste and natural gas distribution sectors must be seized upon immediately 
through regulatory action and strategic infrastructure investments.   In the long term the provincial 
government must take a leadership role in addressing the transportation and land use patterns that 
have locked Ontarians in to expensive and carbon-intensive lifestyles.   Ending the primacy of the 
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automobile in the transportation sector and the suburban single-detached home in the residential 
building sector must be a driving focus of provincial policy development in spite of the political 
challenges that beset politicians embarking on that path.  Achieving this will require policymakers and 
politicians to first overcome the denial that Ontario citizens feel around the impacts of their choices on 
the global climate.  This will involve a greater effort to attribute current weather and natural disasters in 
Ontario to increased GHGs in the atmosphere.  By making the link between personal actions and 
lifestyles and real natural disasters Ontarians will begin to accept the reality that GHGs need to decline 
rapidly and thus support politicians and policies that aim to do just that.   
Furthermore, framing climate change policy as having benefits beyond a reduction in the risk of 
natural disasters in order to demonstrate the multiple environmental, economic and health benefits of 
climate change policy action is essential. Road tolls must be pitched as a method of reducing traffic 
congestion that is causing untold stress and health impacts; and carbon pricing as a way of reducing the 
vulnerability of Ontarians to swings in international energy prices.  With the economy a top concern at 
the moment, climate change policies could be framed as helping to shift consumption away from 
imported fuels thus leaving more money in the pockets of Ontario’s citizens to stimulate domestic 
economic activity that creates jobs for themselves and their families. The abstract goal of reducing GHGs 
to forestall uncertain future climate change impacts will not suffice when individuals are presently facing 
economic and health challenges that lead them to vote in ways that compromise their future. 
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